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The Slovak Republic faces the task to secure conditions for a long-term economic growth. A crucial 
precondition for an efficient implementation of economic measures is the knowledge of the status quo 
and of the impacts on the economy and the society as a whole to be expected from the relevant 
measures. Foreign experience with economic policies can only be adopted when adjusted to the 
conditions of Slovakia’s economy, and attention has to be paid to both short-term and long-term 
prospects of the economic and social development. To be implemented, many economic measures 
require acceptance on the part of the public, and this requires, among other things, direct involvement 
of the citizens in economic processes. The Institute for Economic and Social Reforms (INEKO) shall 
therefore spend efforts to make the public familiar with the nature of economic and social processes in 
Slovakia and abroad, and to eliminate, through economic research and educational activities, 
hindrances to long-term economic growth of Slovakia.   
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FOREWORD 
 
Since the political turnaround in 1989, Slovakia has been undergoing continuous 
changes resulting from both internal and external impacts. These changes cover 
political institutions, a gradual reengineering of the economic policy and the 
establishment of the independent state, as well as the adaptation to the requirements 
for membership in elite clubs (especially the European Union). In such a situation, it 
is of particular importance to investigate not only concrete reforms but also certain 
general features of the process of their adoption and implementation. A similar 
analysis contributes to our understanding of the hitherto development and enables to 
anticipate the future course of events in a more competent way and to formulate 
recommendations for a better public policy-making. The implemented public policy 
and reforms also affect the quality of our lives; hence, their condition is the key factor 
in improving the socio-economic situation in Slovakia. They, too, affect economic 
performance and the fashion in which the assets generated in the economy are 
allocated among the individual parts of the society (see Graph No. 1). 
 
Graph No. 1: Public policy, in/equality and other relevant forces 
External or market forces  
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Public policy and social norms 
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Source: Tanzi (2000) 
 
 
Our study focuses on the formal mechanism of the public policy-making process in 
Slovakia, as well as its actual course, whereby emphasis has been laid on how these 
factors affect the implementation and contents of socio-economic reforms. Although 
this study, in examining the process of the adoption of public policy and reforms in 
Slovakia, has been largely based on a positive analysis (the current state of affair is 
being examined), part of it has been dedicated to the analysis of normative aspects 
(desired state).  
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Chapter I provides a general analysis of the existing literature, especially in the fields 
of economics, political economy, and political science, which we consider important 
for the analysis of the public policy and reforms environment in Slovakia. In Chapter 
II, an empirical examination of the public policy-making framework in Slovakia is 
carried out, particularly of the process of policy-making and its adoption with regard 
to formal and informal rules. Chapter III is dedicated to the role of groups of key 
players in pursuing their interests and their impact upon existing reforms. The closing 
Chapter IV is normative by nature and focuses on selected issues presented in the 
light of our assessment of problems and possible recommendations. 
 
Empirical research of the public policy-making process in Slovakia, seeking to be as 
rigorous as possible, struggles with a lack of data, particularly quantitative data, which 
could be analysed using mathematical methods. On the other hand, however, it should 
be noted that in the analyses of public policy in general and its procedural and 
interest-based aspects in particular, quantitative analysis is not a prevalent component. 
The shortage of “soft” empirical data, which may be derived from published sources, 
poses a more serious problem. 
 
Having these factors in mind, we have decided to present this study only as an initial 
step towards examining the public policy-making process in Slovakia, whereby 
emphasis has been laid on the adoption and implementation of economic and social 
reforms. The study seeks to cast light upon possible ways of future research and is to 
serve as a study material for students interested in the field in question. 
 
The study is largely based on the relevant theoretical and empirical literature, case 
studies, legislative framework analysis, publicly available statistical data, information 
disclosed by the media, as well as original data collected for this publication. 
 
By way of introduction, it should also be emphasised which topics are outside the 
scope of this study. We will not deal with the adoption of public policy at the local 
level, especially because until January 1, 2002, systemic decisions vital to public 
policy had been taken only at the central level, due to a weaker position of 
municipalities and non-existence of self-governing regions. Nor will the study 
examine the role of courts and that of the Constitutional Court in particular with 
respect to public policy.1 Administrative decisions that constitute public policy, such 
as, for instance, the decisions of the Antimonopoly Office of the SR, will be paid only 
a minor attention. All the above areas are yet to be examined in the future. Within the 
limited scope of the publication, the authors have decided to focus on what they 
consider to be the key factors of the current public policy and reforms in Slovakia. 
 
Since the terms below are the keywords of this study, this introduction aims to 
provide their more accurate definitions. 
 
Public policy 
 
There are several definitions of public policy. For the purpose of this study, the most 
accurate and practical is the definition according to which public policy refers to 
                                                 
1 This is not for the insignificance of this component of public authority – the decisions of the 
Constitutional Court of the SR have been of profound importance to many areas. 
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generally “accepted political strategies and solutions“, and also particular strategies 
and solutions adopted in a concrete area (UNDP (2001), p. 14). It is, in fact, a 
summing-up of what public bodies intend to do, or are actually doing in a concrete 
area. There is a certain shift in the meaning in the Slovak language, due to the fact that 
the English language makes a distinction between politics in the conventional 
meaning of the word and policy in the meaning of adopted strategies and solutions. 
Given the fact that the Slovak language does not allow for such a distinction, to 
denote the concept of „policy“, the phrase public policy is used.  
 
In order to formulate public policy, policy documents are used which determine and 
give a concrete form to the trends of public policy in a given area. This formulation is 
further materialised by means of tools detailed in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1: Public Policy Tools 
1. Information  by means of: 
- Advice - Mass dissemination 
- Directions - Selective distribution 
- Data and information - Advertisement and public relations 
instruments 
- Threats and persuasion - Targeting on key players 
- Agreements - Responding to requests 
  
2. Economic Measures by means of: 
- Bargains - Public procurement  
- Incentive and disincentives  - Tax relief 
- Agreed benefits - Grants, loans and subsidies 
  
3. Administrative Measures  
- Provision of specialised services  
- Use of qualified labour force   
- Administration through existing 
government agencies 
 
- Monitoring and inspection  
- Supervision and corrective intervention  
  
4. Lack of Action  
- Reliance on market forces  
- Reliance on public supervision  
- Self-regulation  
Source: OECD (1997), p. 16 
 
Reform 
 
The word reform shows even a greater variety of definitions than public policy. For 
the purpose of this publication, a very simple definition is used – according to which, 
reform is a “deliberate implementation of changes” (Kolarska-Bobinska (2000), p. 7). 
In the context of our study, reform is to be understood as a specific type of public 
policy aimed at a substantial and rapid change of public policy in a certain area, which 
pursues the attainment of a qualitatively new state. 
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In transitional economies, reform is understood, first and foremost, as a process of the 
transformation of the economy and society from command economies to a market 
economy. According to Zemanovičová (2000), one may speak of two transformation 
stages:   
- revolutionary – the implementation of sweeping and rapid changes (privatisation, 
price and foreign trade liberalisation, macroeconomic stabilisation). There is a 
general agreement of economists on the need to implement these steps. These 
measures raise political rather than economic problems; 
- evolutionary – the setting-up of functioning market economy institutions and 
providing for  a long-term and sustainable growth.  
 
Changes and reforms required in the first transformation stage may be implemented 
quite rapidly and there is, more or less, an agreement on the urgency of these steps, 
which is also evidenced by foreign experience.  
 
The second stage is related to several factors limiting the potential and pace of 
changing formal and informal rules. This involves a continuous, long-term process of 
changes, which may be referred to as a permanent reform. According to Jurzyca2, this 
stage is more exacting in terms of time, funds, knowledge, political consensus and 
citizens’ participation in public affairs. It is a stage of evolution, a gradual, continuous 
reform. This reform is not entirely under the control of the state, as it is often reluctant 
or unable to carry out profound changes in the society. Hardly can civil servants be 
expected to willingly change the functioning of offices they hold in favour of society, 
i.e. often to their disadvantage. The ground for reform implementation will not be 
univocal either. The author states that presently it is questionable whether emphasis 
should be laid on the creation of conditions for an accelerated development of 
underdeveloped regions or rather on the promotion of migration to regions with a 
stronger economy. The question to what age citizens ought to be guaranteed equal 
opportunities in education does not invite a clear answer either.  
 
In terms of their pace, reforms may be divided into radical and partial. The reform 
pace is affected by several factors, among which there are also the impacts of reform. 
As regards the impacts of reform implementation, one is faced with a phenomenon 
that is referred to as the “winners-losers“ problem in literature, i.e. a problem 
connected with the emergence of “privileged and non-privileged population groups“, 
which bears implications concerning the course of reform. Tóth (2000) states that the 
majority of traditional economic theories on political implications of economic reform 
are based on the assumption of the “J” curve development, which illustrates 
consumption development after economic reforms are launched. In its initial stages, 
the reform will cause a decline in total consumption, only to exceed its initial level 
later on. According to the above theory, groups (losers) that are the most 
disadvantaged by the reform in the short-run (i.e. the unemployed, pensioners, and 
civil servants facing job cuts) will oppose reforms at the first opportune moment, thus 
enabling populist parties to ascend to power and thwart the reforms as a result. If 
radical reforms are to be realised, the government ought to remain “isolated”, in a 
way, from the influence of the temporarily disadvantaged groups until consumption 
hits the level perceived by the majority of citizens as a benefit of the reform 
                                                 
2 E. Jurzyca: Permanentná reforma. Domino Fórum, June 8, 2000 
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implemented. The opinion that authoritarian regimes have an advantage in 
implementing radical reforms is based on the above theory.  
 
Tóth also argues that the recent experience of the Central and Eastern Europe 
contradicts this conventional view. The progress of reforms is also affected by 
privileged population groups (winners), which significantly benefited from the 
reforms particularly in their initial stages. This, for instance, applies to new owners of 
privatised companies or managers of state banks and state enterprises. Hellmann 
(1998) points out that the initial reform stages created plenty of opportunities for 
economic arbitrage, which enabled economically privileged groups to gain 
concentrated economic benefits. It was in the economic interest of these groups to 
obstruct certain steps of the reform process, because their implementation would have 
resulted in the loss of these extraordinary benefits and elimination of market 
inequalities on which their initial profits from reforms had been based. Therefore, 
these privileged groups do their utmost to sustain the state of partial reforms for as 
long as possible. According to the analysis of the World Bank Institute (Hellmann, 
Jones, Kaufmann (2000)), partial political and economic reforms generate a more 
sophisticated level of state capture. “State capture” is to be understood as efforts of 
companies to influence the contents of legislation, laws, decrees, and other regulations 
by means of unofficial payments to public officials. Through state capture, companies 
try to gain benefit from the state by applying distorted rules of the game. The World 
Bank has devised a so-called State Capture Index, which expresses the extent of the 
sale of deputies’ votes in support of private interests, court rulings, and so forth. The 
imperfect nature of the legislative, regulatory, and control systems allows private 
companies to turn politicians and civil servants into their vassals in the sense that the 
latter adopt “à la carte” legislation and regulations that meet the needs of individual 
companies. Based on the above index, there are some countries with a high level and 
some with a low level of state capture,3 with a significant gap between them.  If the 
state is exposed to a certain level of capture, the pace of capture growth accelerates. A 
high level of state capture by private interests results in economic stagnation and 
decline. 
                                                 
3 According to this survey, Slovakia has been ranked among countries with a high state capture index. 
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CHAPTER I: Public Policy-Making Environment 
 
Public policy-making in different countries varies depending on the specificities of the 
environment in a given country shaped by formal and informal rules.  
 
Interests are the key factor affecting the making and advocacy of individual changes 
and reforms in society. Reforms and public policy are largely about the advocacy of 
interests, which may be generally referred to as individual, group, and public interests.  
 
Speaking of individual interests, they concern individuals, be it natural or legal 
persons. A number of individual needs and interests of citizens and legal persons may 
be satisfied by the private sector that generates private assets.  
 
Individual interests are grouped into common group interests.4 These interests may 
be professional, national, racial, cultural, regional or given by age, gender and the 
like. Various interest associations of natural or legal persons advocate commonly 
shared goals and interests.  
 
There are also interests the satisfaction of which concerns everyone or a large 
majority of the society and which cannot be assured in more complex social systems 
on an individual basis (such as security, including foreign security, setting rules and 
their enforcement).5 
 
There are also economic reasons (market failure) due to which interventions are made 
in the economy for the sake of the public interest.6 
 
Public interest7 is a delegated individual interest that ought to reflect the consensus 
of the majority. In this context, the public interest may be defined as an interest that is 
viewed by those who duly enforce authority as the most appropriate for public 
welfare. Sičáková and Zemanovičová (2000) state that since there is no unanimity on 
whether a public policy or measure can enhance public welfare, the public interest is 
perceived as a flexible concept accommodating a wide range of opinions. The content 
of the notion of public interest is also determined by culture differences. On the other 
hand, there are limits set for the concept of public interest.  In democratic societies, it 
is the public sector that is tasked with decision-making and enforcement of the public 
interest. This, for instance, concerns deputies at a central or decentralised level, who 
are installed in the positions of the representatives of public interest by free elections, 
as well as state and public administration or judges.  
 
                                                 
4 Interest groups are detailed in Chapter III 
5 For instance, A. Smith refers to three basic functions of the state: 
- protection against an act of aggression (security issue) 
- protection of each member against injustice  
- preservation of some public work and public institutions which could not be built and 
maintained in the interests of an individual or a group 
6 For details refer to Zemanovičová et. al. (1998) 
7 For details refer to Sičáková and Zemanovičová (2000) 
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Selecting “the very best” or “the most appropriate” of the existing desires and needs 
to be provided for, especially if the resources of the society are limited, is a most 
complex task.8 Taking decisions on the benefits of privately owned assets is easy for 
consumers – the only decision they have to make is whether or not to make a 
purchase. However, this simple method is not available if a decision is to be taken on 
the benefits of one asset in comparison with other publicly funded assets. Decision-
making on the allocation of funds in the public sector follows different rules. In the 
public sector, many material and financial decisions are subject to political decisions. 
In such a case, the role of the market as an allocation mechanism is eliminated or 
limited.9 
 
According to Stiglitz (1997), economic theory has so far been unable to introduce a 
theory that would express an optimal distribution of resources while taking account of 
the influence of interest groups. Generally speaking, the supply of the public sector is 
dictated by a political mechanism. Hence, political mechanisms serve as a means for 
the resolution of disputes on the role of the government in the public sector supply. 
 
Citizens vote for their elected representatives, who in turn vote on public budgets. 
Expenditure is reviewed by numerous bodies of the public sector. In fact, there is a 
considerable difference in the way individual consumers decide on their expenditure 
and the way the parliament or public administration decides on public expenditure. 
This is one of the reasons behind conflicts and tension between various interests. 
Legitimate questions are: what the basis of the decisions should be and how various 
opinions of the electorate pursuing different interests ought to be weighted. Our 
approach to addressing the above perplexities depends on several factors, namely, on 
the nature of the state and possible failures of the state. It is also important to take 
account of the “power” factor of individual interest groups in advocating their 
interests and tools used. Also, it is worthwhile to consider the possible negative 
impacts of the activities of interest groups. Among other vital factors are, for instance, 
social attitude, which may be influenced by the cultural heritage or religion, the level 
of economic development, the openness of the economy or technological 
advancement, and so forth. 
 
Decision-making and subsequent implementation of adopted measures are affected by 
systemic characteristics such as the nature of the state, internal characteristics of the 
public sector, state failures, interest groups organisation, and some other factors 
affecting public policy. 
 
The above factors are described in more detail below. 
 
I.1. State types 
 
Decision-making in the public sector is affected by the state type. Several theories 
seek to explain the way governments behave. 
 
The basic categorisation of states according to their political systems can be found in 
Andrain (1994), who applies the following criteria: 
                                                 
8 The above deliberation is inevitable in view of the fact that our resources are limited. 
9 Strecková, Malý et. al. (1998) 
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- cultural values that create public policy goals 
- power exercised by structures over the public policy-making process 
- conduct of public policy-makers and individuals who are less involved in this 
process (p. 7). 
 
Based on the above criteria, the author recognises: 
- folk systems 
- bureaucratic-autocratic systems 
- reconciliation systems 
- mobilisation systems 
 
Formal government institutions responsible for decision-making are alien to folk 
systems. These systems are segmented, decentralised, and egalitarian, based on the 
relations in both nuclear and extended families (ibid p. 15). The power of structures 
vis-à-vis the general public is limited and the gap between the leaders and their 
adherents is also small (ibid, p. 8). Material and spiritual values are homogenous; 
hunting or primitive agriculture is connected with religion. These pre-modern 
societies have almost vanished by now. 
 
Bureaucratic-autocratic systems are based on the dominant position of the state vis-à-
vis social groups. Strong administration subdues an open conflict in the society. 
Coercion prevails over consensus (ibid, p. 24 – 26). Dominant political opinions stress 
collectivism, the predominance of material interests over spiritual and ethical ones, 
and elitist and detached relationship between those who govern and those who are 
governed (ibid, p. 27). 
 
In reconciliation systems, civil liberties are guaranteed and the loyalty of leaders to 
political freedom is ensured by pluralism in the society and state structures. Public 
policy-makers advocate various interests and the overriding principle is the seeking of 
compromise and reconciliation between these interests (ibid, p. 43). Political belief in 
the reconciliation system requires separation of material values from ethical and 
spiritual ones. The relationship between those who govern and those who are 
governed is based on a representative relationship. Various social groups maintain 
their distinct autonomy from the state (ibid, p. 46). 
 
The last type of a political system is referred to as a mobilisation system. Its leaders 
seek to achieve a speedy and sweeping transformation of the state and society (ibid, p. 
69). Under their leadership, material goals are united with ideological values and the 
gap between those who govern and those who are governed shrinks. Mobilisation 
systems can be populist or elitist. France after the revolution in 1789 is an example of 
the former, Russia and Stalin an example of the latter (ibid, p. 70 – 71). Presently, 
there is no significant mobilisation system in the world. 
 
In the late 20th century, Slovakia transitioned from what used to be a combination of 
mobilisation and bureaucratic-autocratic systems (before 1989) to a reconciliation 
system (after 1989). However, common behavioural patterns in political and social 
life will take more time to change. Viewing public policy from the economic point of 
view, Tanzi (2000) distinguishes the following state types: monopolistic, 
individualistic, and paternalistic. 
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Monopolistic state 
 
In a monopolistic state, the ruling class, group, or political party is in control of the 
government apparatus and makes use of it to maximise the welfare of its members. 
Hence, there is a concern about the role of the public interest. The majority of 
government activities are aimed at maximising the welfare of that segment of the 
population that is in control of the government apparatus. In simplified terms, this 
entails the creation of jobs in the public sector for those supporting the ruling party, or 
support for public investments or public education and training which bring benefits 
to groups or regions belonging to the ruling group.  
 
In order to ensure these goals, financial instruments are required. Such a process may 
result in such taxation and public expenditure levels and structures that are different 
from those based on modern public finance theories. It is the ruling stratum of the 
society that benefits most from public finance.  
 
These government types were very frequent in the past and have not quite disappeared 
by now.  
 
Individualistic state  
 
This type of state is based on a proposition that “individuals not only have a say in 
determining the role of the state, but the state is in fact here to serve them”. In other 
words, there are no collective “desires”, there are only “desires” of individuals. 
Hence, public welfare is a sum of the welfare of individuals in a given society and at a 
given moment in time. With regard to taxation and public expenditure levels and 
structures, there should not be a difference between the goals of taxpayers and the 
goals of those who manage the given fields and make decisions. According to this 
concept, an individualistic state should not create opportunities for the government to 
abuse fiscal illusion.10 Moreover, the government is even expected to educate the 
electorate so that citizens would avoid making mistakes related to fiscal illusion 
concerning income and expenditure. All decisions concerning taxation and public 
expenditure should be free from fiscal illusions and based on an objective evaluation 
of costs and benefits. Governments support such taxation that clearly identifies the 
taxpayer (for instance, income taxpayer). The budgeting process seeks to cover all 
expenditure and is transparent by nature.  
 
Paternalistic state  
 
In this type of state, the public interest is not a sum of the interests of all citizens. In a 
paternalistic society, the government may, on behalf of the state, advocate interests 
that are more than just a sum of the interests of citizens, and it pursues such public 
                                                 
10 According to Puviani (1973), governments do not aspire after the maximisation of the difference 
between objective benefits gained from public expenditures and objective costs relating to the 
allocation of these expenditures. According to the author, governments are focused on the 
maximisation of the difference between subjective, and often faulty, evaluations of benefits associated 
with public expenditures and their costs. He claims that this process is dynamic rather than static – 
governments not only passively accept and use these subjective and faulty evaluations of costs and 
benefits, but they even actively support them. Hence, fiscal illusion is not a random error on the part of 
taxpayers, but often a systemic error introduced by the government. 
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policies that may not necessarily be consistent with the policies in an individualistic 
state. If compared with the public interest as a sum of the welfare of all individuals in 
a given society, on condition that such summation is feasible, an interest advocated in 
a paternalistic state would be considerably different. The creation and use of fiscal 
illusions help the state advocate these public policies. However, the basic difference is 
that rather than being coupled with the selfish goals of individuals or groups which 
are in control of the government - which is the case of a monopolistic state - these 
activities are pursued in the interest of “the society/country/people/proletariat” or 
other abstract concepts.  
 
I.2. State failures  
 
There is a difference between what the public sector should do and what it actually 
does. The reasons why this happens in the real world cover potential differences in the 
interests of those who govern and those who are governed, through those who 
implement adopted measures, down to the mistakes and fallacies of policy-makers, 
inadequate control of strategic instruments on the part of policy-makers, etc.11 
 
Hence, there may be differences between the expectations and actual outcomes of 
various measures adopted by the public sector due to state failures. As stated by 
Zemanovičová (2000), the problem of state failures is, as opposed to market failures, 
a less scrutinised area of theoretical research. State failures are numerous. Their 
causes are to be sought in the following: 
 
- Political leadership educational background 
 
Even if political leaders (policy-makers, MPs and Cabinet members) do their utmost 
to adopt the best solution, their education and training may not necessarily be 
sufficient for such a task. 
 
- Indirect implementation of adopted measures 
  
In public administration, entities bearing the costs of regulation are separated from 
entities benefiting from it. Moreover, there is usually no direct link between an 
adopted regulatory measure and the responsibility for its application. Policy-makers 
(such as MPs or Cabinet members) take decisions on strategic measures. Decisions 
taken at the “top“ level must be implemented in a top-down fashion. A quite common 
problem is that those who are tasked with the implementation of these measures have 
their own plans or feel that these strategies and decisions could be harmful to them or 
groups they belong to. Therefore, during implementation, measures may be changed 
or distorted and the result will differ from the original expectation. Identical problems 
are encountered when public administration is either incompetent or corrupt. 
Government control over the bureaucratic machinery that enforces the law and 
influences its efficiency is therefore limited.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 For details refer to Tanzi (2000) 
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- Limited scope of information  
 
The impacts of many decisions are complex and difficult to predict and not all 
information may be available to the government. Because of that, its intervention is 
inadequate. Numerous state interventions in the economy desensitise the system, 
which finds it difficult to disclose the actual purpose of these regulatory interventions. 
Frequent interventions also make the environment less transparent, and it is difficult 
to say whether particular forms of regulation have been effective or not. The 
economic system is therefore difficult both to manage and predict.12 
 
- Limitations relating to the political process   
 
Even if the government were perfectly informed of potential impacts of its decisions, 
these decisions are also motivated by the need to influence the electorate or advocate 
the interests of certain groups. Politicians may favour personal interests. According to 
Stigler, the inability of the government to represent the interests of the public at large 
is not only an outcome of its dishonesty, but also, to a large extent, it results from the 
mechanism of functioning of political institutions in democratic societies. Political 
myopia is manifested in an effort to solve market failures for the sake of political 
motives. Short electoral terms lead to a clash between political short-term interests 
and a longer period required for analysing and understanding whether a regulatory 
intervention is needed and for its preparation. The outcome may be that the measures 
adopted, politically efficient as they are, may turn out to be economically inefficient.13 
 
- Public administration quality, human resources, and the interests of 
bureaucracy 
 
A low standard of public administration may impose limitations on an efficient state 
intervention in the individual fields of the public policy implementation. It seems that 
the less developed a country is, the more it can benefit from a more solid position of 
the state, which promotes the market and remedies its flaws. According to Tanzi 
(2000), it holds that the less developed the country, the more incompetent its public 
administration is. Among the unpleasant facts of the economic development is that the 
countries in which a more solid position of the public sector is needed most are the 
countries in which the public sector is least prepared to carry out this function 
efficiently. Zemanovičová (2000) states that the problem of transitional economies is 
that the state (or public administration) is faced with its own reform, and although it 
has assumed new functions, it has not quite got rid of its old ones. Often, this results 
in such economic interventions that are referred to as regulatory barriers. In a number 
of countries, licences or authorisations are required in order to perform many 
economic activities. Such a situation gives power to bureaucrats to abort economic 
decisions of natural persons and companies, so granting a licence can often be 
conditioned by giving bribes to people in charge of such decisions. 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 Zemanovičová (2000) 
13 Zemanovičová (2000) 
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- Linkage with previous measures and a strong organised interest in the status 
quo  
 
Given the fact that a number of measures have long-term effects, public policy 
implementation in a relevant field and at a given moment in time is markedly 
influenced by past measures. The decisions of previous governments continue to 
profoundly affect the present economic function of the state and impose limitations on 
the current actions of the government. Decisions having long-term effects create legal 
or implicit claims or demands that may be changed by the present government in the 
short-run only with great difficulties, if ever. Actually, there is no government that 
could start with a clean slate, unburdened of past commitments. The current economic 
policy is, to some extent, a slave of decisions made by previous governments. Those 
groups that benefit from the past decisions will oppose reforms, even if these are in 
the public interest. This is in part why some economists claim that authoritarian 
governments enjoy greater freedom in the implementation of growth-promoting 
strategies. Often, present governments are held responsible for economic problems 
largely caused by the decisions of past governments.  
 
- Historical influence 
 
The present function of the state and concrete measures in public policy are also 
shaped by historical development. In a number of industrial countries they were 
influenced by the experience from the Great Depression in the 1930s, wars and the 
threat of communism – all of which compelled previous governments to adopt 
extraordinary measures. In a number of developing countries, the function of the state 
was affected by their experience of the colonial period. For instance, nationalisation in 
some newly independent states was partly due to the fact that a lot of their leading 
companies were controlled by individuals who came from colonial powers.14 
 
I.3. Interest groups and the political system  
 
According to Zeigler (1992), interest groups can be generally understood as formal 
organisations aimed to influence public policy in democratic societies.  
  
Interest groups rank among open societies. The 
manner in which they are organised, the criterion of 
the loyalty of its members and techniques applied to 
attain their goals vary depending on the political 
culture in which they operate.  
 
Generally speaking, there are two models of 
political culture which we find useful for 
understanding the substance of interest groups - plurali
 
 
  
 
                                                 
14 For instance, Slovakia is influenced by the history of Au
years of the socialist governance of public affairs Companies that need solid 
banks are able to coordinate 
their action and lobby more 
effectively than individuals who 
are dissatisfied with the bad 
health-care system. 
Domino Fórum, 25. 1. 2001 sm and corporatism. 
stro-Hungarian bureaucracy and 40 
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I.3.1. Pluralism  
 
Pluralism is to be understood as a system of several competing interest groups taking 
part in public policy-making. This assumes the existence of a system in which interest 
groups are set up, organised, make efforts to lobby, continue to operate or cease to 
exist, practically without the involvement or support of government bureaucracy. 
Pluralism may be characterised as a structured free-market system with groups 
coming and going without positive or negative sanctions on the part of the 
government. Measures adopted in the public sector are an outcome of negotiations 
and a compromise of elite groups. 
 
The pluralistic theory is based on a belief that individuals may address their wishes 
and needs to the state by means of group activities. In large and complex 
communities, the chance of individuals to be heard is limited, not to speak of their 
chance to influence the decision-making process in the public sector. However, if 
more individuals sharing the same interest unite, the weight of their shared opinion is 
greater than the sum of individual opinions. Pluralists approach interest groups as 
channels that are instrumental in pursuing a democratic ideal of a legitimate and 
gratifying interaction with the public sector. They believe in a more or less even 
distribution of opportunities to win political support. According to pluralists, 
individual groups enjoy equal opportunities in the setting-up of their organisations and 
winning of political support.  
 
In addition, pluralism assumes that humans strive for a rational maximisation of 
welfare and they associate in expectation of political benefits. By setting up and 
running an organisation, conditions are created for the establishment of another 
organisation - its counterbalance. However, setting up an organisation is neither easy 
nor cheap. It requires money, time, or courage. Therefore, what matters is the 
conditions under which the interest groups market can be entered. 
 
The critics of pluralism challenge the “undemocratic” nature of interest groups and 
the motives behind the setting-up of such groups. The areas criticised are elucidated in 
the text below. 
 
Masses versus elites 
 
The critics of pluralism argue that organisations which are expected to establish a link 
between the public sector and the general public are undemocratic by their nature. 
However, pluralists do not assert that mass participation is required and feasible. 
Often, debates on the issue of undemocratic organisations carrying out a 
representative function are concluded by a phrase about “competing elites”. 
According to pluralists, this is a more appropriate variant, in contrast to corporatism, 
which is perceived as a kind of monopoly, because the interest group market is 
occupied by more entities advocating alternative opinions and attitudes, which are 
mutually competitive. 
 
 
 
 
 
  19 
Political or personal benefits?  
 
Another issue raised by the critics of pluralism concerns the reason why people decide 
to participate. Are they driven by political or personal benefits? The critics of 
pluralism often argue that individuals do not join a group for political motives. They 
claim that for rationally thinking individuals a shared attitude is not an argument 
strong enough for becoming organised in groups, and nor is it for an individual to join 
a group, unless it is very small. An individual realises that as long as other individuals 
are organised in groups, value added from his or her individual membership is rather 
insignificant. And, since “the common good” is collective by nature, individuals may 
enjoy the benefits of the activities performed by organised groups regardless of their 
personal participation in them. Figuratively speaking, this is a ”free-rider problem” - 
an individual will not contribute to reaching a specific goal, however, once the goal is 
reached, he or she reaps personal benefits from it. 
 
Generally speaking, a decision to participate is also contingent on the availability of 
benefits. Do individuals participate in an interest group in pursuit of collective or 
selective good? The collective good cannot be distributed selectively, i.e. some 
individuals are eligible for it and some not. The selective good means that a certain 
group benefits from its membership of an organisation, whereby non-members are 
deprived of these benefits. A good example can be the case of Pensioners‘ 
Association, which cannot bar non-members’ access to public health insurance for 
which it lobbied. However, what it can do is to bar access to low-priced 
pharmaceuticals, which are available to its members due to quantity discounts. If a 
rational pensioner enters the system, he or she will benefit from it. Hence, the motives 
for membership offered by the Pensioners‘ Association are selective by their nature. 
However, selective motives have nothing in common with the organisation‘s goals 
and there is no guarantee that the members of the organisation would support them.  
 
According to several public opinion polls,15 the motive behind joining many 
organisations is a selective benefit gained. However, the underlying motive for a 
membership in many other organisations is the collective good (political commitment 
and interest). Physicians join their association to gain a selective benefit, while 
women become members of a women‘s association because they wish to support its 
programme. 
 
Zeigler (1992) assumes that as regards the economic maximisation of their benefits, 
members of numerous interest groups behave irrationally. Their motives vary 
depending on the nature of particular organisations and type of decision. A decision to 
continue with membership may be motivated differently from a decision to join an 
organisation, because in the former case, an individual has more information on the 
organisation. Generally speaking, a selective benefit is more relevant in the case of 
membership continuation. This gives more freedom to lobbyists, because compared 
with “veterans“, new members are less knowledgeable about the aspirations of an 
organisation.  
 
                                                 
15 For details refer to Zeigler (1992) 
  
 
I.3.2. Corporatism  
 
The vital aspects of public policy are often implemented after discussions between the 
government and monopolistic interest groups, which enjoy an exclusive right to 
represent employers and employees, for instance. 
 
The position of corporatism as a form of relationship between the state and the society 
is that between liberal pluralism and totalitarian systems (Wiarda (1997), p. 6) 
Corporatism means: (ibid, p.7) 
• a strong but not totalitarian state, 
• structured interest groups whose number and functions are usually limited, 
• interest groups as part of the state. 
 
In the current practice of political science, corporatism is mostly used to describe 
tripartite structures functioning in certain forms in several European countries. This is 
referred to as neo-corporatism or democratic corporatism (refer to Wiarda (1997) and 
Katzenstein (1984)). 
 
In general, corporatist governments “recognise” such umbrella organisations that 
represent a large number of smaller organisations (for instance, Trade Unions 
Confederation). Given the fact that corporatist decision-making is largely driven by 
economic incentives – salaries or income policy, trade balance, deficits, etc. – the 
government will approach only those interest groups that are directly linked to such 
policies. Hence, corporatism may be defined as an alliance between economic interest 
groups. By granting a quasi-formal status, for instance in the form of mandatory 
tripartite negotiations, the relation between leading associations and the government 
creates powerful incentives for economic interest groups. Under such a system, other 
entities resort to conventional lobbying techniques within the pluralistic political 
system.  
 
Neither the pluralistic nor the 
corporatist system of relationship 
between the state and the society is 
ideal for representing the opinions of 
the members of voluntary 
organisations. While the incentive of 
selective benefits is less problematic 
in the case when the membership in a 
relevant association is almost 
compulsory and access is granted for 
potential applicants to the benefits 
gained, nothing suggests that the 
functional representation of 
corporatism is more appropriate than “l
in a pluralistic system the response of
corporatist system of elites may allow fo
 
 
  
If teachers’ trade union openly supports a
political party, because it promises more
finance for education, it is an interest group.
However, if Peter and George pull together,
because Peter knows a minister and George is a
friend of a state secretary and they get a
government contract using their contacts, they
are a group of crooks. 
Sme, 13. 11. 1999 
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aissez-faire” pluralistic representation. While 
 elites to members’ demand is imperfect, a 
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I.4. Some other factors affecting public policy  
 
There are several factors affecting the course of reforms and their substance, which 
could be classified as informal rules. Culture, traditions and social norms in a given 
society are also powerful factors. Social capital and the so-called arm’s length 
relationship will serve us as good examples.  
 
I.4.1. Social capital 
 
According to Putnam (1993), the state and the market are commonly viewed as two 
alternative mechanisms for solving social problems; however, history has shown that 
both the state and the market function more efficiently if ingrained in a civil society. 
Coleman (1990) criticised the economic theory of perfect competition on the market, 
as it is based on a proposition that the society is composed of individuals whose 
actions are target-driven, and the functioning of the social system is composed of a 
combination of the actions of individuals. Coleman claims that individuals do not act 
independently. Goals are not reached independently and interests are not always 
egoistic. In his opinion, interpersonal relations and networks are vital for reaching 
personal goals. He regards these relations and networks as assets - the capital of 
individuals, a kind of social capital. Sičáková (2000) states that success in coping with 
dilemmas between the collective approach and individual opportunism is contingent 
on a broader social context in which the life of a given society takes place. Voluntary 
co-operation is easier in a society that has inherited a sufficient amount of social 
capital in the form of reciprocity norms and networks, which have a potential to 
enhance efficiency of the society by support for and developing mutually co-ordinated 
activities. 
 
There are several definitions of social capital, which give prominence to its 
manifestations rather than social capital per se. Social capital is a materialised 
informal norm promoting co-operation between two and more individuals. Putnam16 
interprets social capital as a network of social relationships and connections within a 
local community. A peculiar feature of social capital, in addition to trust, reciprocity 
norms and networks, is its nature of a public asset. As an attribute of a social structure 
in which an individual functions, social capital is not privately owned by any 
individual who benefits from it.  
 
Several authors have attempted to elucidate the effects and relationships of social 
capital. In terms of its significance for political stability, state administration 
efficiency, and economic growth, Putnam (1993) places social capital before physical 
or human capital. Thus, social capital, like other forms of capital, is found productive 
and it allows to reach certain goals which in its absence17 would not be feasible, or 
their implementation would be much more exacting. Social capital is vital for the 
functioning of the modern economy and constitutes the cultural component of the 
modern society. Fukuyama (1995) points out the impact of social capital on the forms 
of the organisation of businesses, which prevail in a concrete society. 
 
                                                 
16 Domino Fórum, July 19, 2001 
17 A group which enjoys credibility and internal trust has a chance to achieve much more than a 
comparable group which has no credibility or internal trust. This also relates to transaction costs. 
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If one comes to power, 
even his pig will go to 
Heaven. 
 Chinese proverb 
Putnam18 distinguishes two types of social capital. The first type is based on a specific 
reciprocity – I’ll help you and you’ll help me. However, a generalised reciprocity is 
more intriguing – I’ll help you and you’ll help him/her. The difference between 
specific and generalised reciprocity is that between trust in a close circle and trust in 
an open community. The author states that there is a difference between social 
relations that function as a bond between you and individuals of your kind, and 
between relations that establish ties between you and individuals that are different 
from you. The former is referred to as bonding, the latter as bridging social capital. 
Both forms are important. However, if the bonding social capital is the only form of 
social capital in the society, the outcome is Bosnia. Politically, the bridging social 
capital is of particular importance. Interpersonal relations with individuals that are 
different are vital for creating a climate of trust in a wider society. 
 
Also, the negative forms of social capital and its potential consequences should be 
mentioned. For instance, mafia or corruption may emerge as a consequence of 
favouring one‘s friends or relatives. In Denmark, corruption, if any, would be 
perceived as an isolated action of certain individuals who attempt to make use of their 
positions for personal benefit. In other words, it would reflect an anti-social conduct, 
which is not caused by social pressure or prevalent social norms. In such a case, 
identifying the agent of corruption would be easier, since the victim of corruption 
would be more likely to report it to the authorities. His or her punishment would be 
easier, as it would be in compliance with the generally accepted social norms. 
However, in communities with tighter social or interpersonal bonds, corruption would 
be more frequent, its identification more difficult and punishment more problematic.  
 
I.4.2. Arm’s length relationship 
 
The application of this principle to economic decision-making requires that 
interpersonal relations be excluded from economic decision-making that involves 
more than one party. Equal treatment of all actors is vital for a good functioning of the 
market economy. From the economic point of view, one ought to treat his or her 
relatives and friends as one would treat a stranger.  
 
Cultural factors play an important role in analysing the arm‘s length relationship. For 
instance, to Indians, certain type of behaviour widely accepted in Denmark would 
appear as immoral. In India, relatives would expect preferential treatment in dealings 
with individuals in the private sector as well as public administration.  
 
In a country dominated by the arm‘s length relationship, 
bureaucratic behaviour according to Weber‘s bureaucratic 
model is likely to acclimatise faster. In some countries, 
establishing impartial bureaucracy, which would observe 
clearly set formal rules providing no room for nepotism or 
clientelism, could be in conflict with accepted social 
norms, which dictate that the family and friends come first. In communities expecting 
a public employee, like any other individual, to give preferential treatment to his or 
her relatives or friends, such behaviour would ultimately require violation of laws, 
administrative rules and divergence from “universal principles”. An individual who is 
                                                 
18 Domino Fórum, July 19, 2001 
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reluctant to render this kind of assistance is regarded as breaking the prevalent code of 
ethics and faces ostracism. India and Denmark are two extreme examples of the 
interaction of individuals within a community. The majority of communities can 
probably be placed between the two extremes.  
 
Generally accepted social norms with a long-term effect are often more powerful than 
new and imported rules based on the arm‘s length relationship. This is another reason 
why some reforms that implicitly assume or require the application of the arm‘s 
length relationship are doomed to failure, or their implementation takes longer. The 
creation of social capital is considered to be a task for the “second generation” of 
economic reforms; however, as distinct from economic policy or economic 
institutions, social capital can be neither easily created nor shaped on the basis of 
public policy.  
 
I.5. Other theoretical frameworks of deliberations on the public policy 
environment 
 
In addition to the above analytical frameworks, some other interdisciplinary 
approaches especially from the area of economics, law, and politology should be 
mentioned in conjunction with the public policy-making. Our aim is to draw attention 
to their existence, as some of these frameworks will be used for further deliberations 
in our study. 
 
First and foremost, the analysis of the public policy-making process must take account 
of the overall modern microeconomic analysis and focus on the following questions:  
• information asymmetry and related conclusions – the principal-agent theory (see 
Milgrom and Roberts (1992))19 
• strategic interactions with emphasis on the game theory (Baird, Gertner and Picker 
(1998))20 
 
Another important area is the so-called rational political economy, which tries to 
analyse the political process and public policy-making based on a framework which 
assumes rationality and the maximisation of utility for all parties to the process (i.e. 
behaviour based on a rational analysis of the maximum benefit for an individual). Its 
application to public policy and public administration is presented by Horn (1995). 
 
New institutional economics (for instance, refer to Coase (1960), Miller, Benjamin 
and North (200), North (1190)) pursues the same direction only to some extent. It puts 
emphasis on the motivations of the individual parties to the process, however, it 
                                                 
19 These are questions about how transactions may be influenced by the fact that one party has 
access to relevant information while the other does not. This question is relevant from our point of 
view especially in the context of the principal-agent theory, whereby the principal hires an agent to 
carry out certain activities to the benefit of the former. This theory gives rise to interesting questions 
concerning the manner in which the principal ought to structure the contract with the agent, 
especially if the principle cannot control the agent’s work or all its results directly. This theory is 
relevant for the electorate vs. politician relationship. 
20 The game theory and the analysis of strategic interactions deal with situations when an 
individual’s decision and optimum results from his/her point of view depend on the decisions of 
another individual; hence, it is inevitable to take account of a mutual interaction of decisions and 
strategies. 
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underscores that these motivations can be co-determined not only by rational factors 
but also informal norms (customs, unwritten rules), which may – but need not always 
- bring results identical with those of the rational maximisation of utility. 
 
For over three decades, law and economics has been in existence as an 
interdisciplinary science that examines the possibilities of the application of economic 
thinking to legal issues. Comparative law and economics is a unique component 
within this discipline, which focuses on the comparison and economic analysis of 
selected aspects of law in various countries (Cooter and Ulen (1997), Mattei (1998)). 
In conjunction with this, the authors wish to draw the reader‘s attention to the 
following relevant pieces of information:  
• a concrete legal solution to a certain issue in a certain country often is, but need 
not be, the most efficient solution in the light of the economic analysis; 
• given the fact that legal systems change gradually and slowly, it supports the 
assertions of new institutional economics, but rather in the field of formal norms; 
• due to various processes in law-making, there is competition within and between 
countries; 
• in spite of that, the basis of a legal system (especially continental vs. Anglo-Saxon 
law and also within these law systems) is largely determined historically; hence, it 
is not feasible to a priori postulate a gradual dominance of economically more 
efficient solutions;  
• in addition, concrete law transplants tend to acquire a new meaning under new 
conditions. 
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CHAPTER II:  Basic Framework of Public Policy Process in Slovakia 
 
II.1. Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter we dealt in general with the theoretical framework for the 
analysis of the public policy-making process. This chapter studies the empirical 
framework of public policy-making in Slovakia and primarily the process of 
formulation and adoption of the policy in terms of both formal and informal rules. 
 
The public policy-making process in Slovakia is regulated by formal norms 
(Constitution of the SR, laws, secondary legislation, government resolutions, 
guidelines), as well as by non-formal norms (customs that have developed since the 
creation of the Slovak government on 1 January 1969, but mainly since the change of 
the political system in November 1989 and after the establishment of the independent 
Slovak Republic (SR) on 1 January 1993). In this part of the study, we will focus on 
the long-term stable formal rules laid down in the Constitution and in a number of 
other laws, as well as on the actual form of the public policy-making process based on 
the interoperation of the formal and non-formal rules.  
 
The primary formal norm that regulates public policy-making at present is the 
Constitution of the SR adopted in 1992 and significantly amended in 2001. The parts 
related to public policy-making, however, have practically not changed since 1992, 
therefore we can do with a single description and analysis. The Constitution of the SR 
does not recognise the concept of public policy, but it speaks to the tools that are de 
facto used for its implementation, as well as to the mutual relations of the bodies 
responsible for the development and utilisation of these tools. Within the framework 
of strongly legalistic approach, characteristic not only of Slovakia, but also of 
neighbouring countries, the major tools of public policy implementation are laws and 
related secondary legislation. Apart from these, the Constitution also recognises 
documents such as the government manifesto, the principal measures aimed at 
ensuring the economic and social policy of the SR, and the principal issues of internal 
and foreign policy.  
 
The most important bodies responsible for the development and utilisation of the 
abovementioned tools are the National Council of the Slovak Republic (the NC SR, 
the parliament) and the Government of the Slovak Republic. The NC SR, on the basis 
of its democratic mandate originating from the parliamentary election, has both direct 
and indirect effect on public policy tools. The direct effect is realised through 
initiating and enacting laws as the fundamental norms that set „the rules of the 
game“21. Only MPs and parliament committees have – apart from the government – 
the right to initiate legislation.22 The indirect influence is exercised by the National 
Council through influencing the composition of the government, the contents of its 
mandate and through the oversight of its work.23 Based on the government manifesto, 
the National Council has to pass a vote of confidence in the government, and it can 
remove individual government members from office. The parliament sets – through 
laws – the boundaries for the work of the executive by defining mutual relations 
between the segments of the executive and by limiting the room for the public policy 
                                                 
21 Art. 86, the Constitution of the SR 
22 Art. 87, ibid. 
23 Art. 86, 113, 114, ibid. 
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performed through the decisions of the government, ministries or other bodies of state 
administration.  
 
The government, as a collective body of the executive, takes decisions not only on 
government-sponsored bills and government ordinances, but also on all principal 
measures aimed at ensuring the economic and social policy of the SR and on the 
principal issues of internal and foreign policy of the SR.24 As a result, on the basis of 
the Constitution, the government concentrates in its hands the chief responsibility for 
the implementation of public policy that has already been adopted, as well as an 
important share of responsibility for the formulation of public policy proposals.  
 
The process of public policy-making is further developed by a number of laws. 
Among the most important ones are the Act on the Division of Tasks and 
Responsibilities (the so-called “Competences” Act) and the Parliament’s Rules of 
Procedure.  
 
The Act on the Division of Tasks and Responsibilities allocates responsibility for 
particular areas of policy to ministries and other central government agencies. The Act 
vests in the bodies the responsibility for the formulation of a single State policy in the 
allocated areas, as well as for the implementation of the policy.25 The Act further 
tasks them to study „the issues in matters that fall under their jurisdiction and to 
analyse the results achieved… to take measures aimed at solving current issues… to 
work out strategies for the development of the assigned areas and for dealing with 
major issues, to prepare drafts of proposed legislation and – after the review process – 
to present them to the government.“26 
  
On the other hand, the Parliament’s Rules of Procedure27 govern, inter alia, how draft 
legislation is introduced to, and enacted by, the parliament, while a number of 
procedural provisions can have a significant impact on the contents of laws and 
therefore also on public policy. These are notably the following: the procedure of 
three readings, in the framework of which a draft law is passed28; the incorporation of 
the government’s opinions on MP-sponsored bills29; and the provisions on the 
coordinating committee and on proposing amendments to a bill.  
 
Another level of legal norms in this area is secondary legislation, i.e. regulations of 
a lesser legal power, including even guidelines. Secondary legislation includes for 
example the Government’s Rules of Procedure; the so-called legislative rules; and the 
rules of presenting materials to the government meeting. These regulations mostly 
regulate in detail the process of formulating, consulting, presenting and adopting 
policy and legislative documents by the government and parliament. Despite the fact 
that these norms are easier to amend – for example by a decision of the government or 
the head of the Government Office, their development since 1990 has only been very 
gradual and their main features have been maintained.  
                                                 
24 Art. 119 ibid. 
25 Section 35 of the Act on the Organisation of Central Government Agencies 
26 Sections 36 and 37 ibid. 
27 Act of the NC SR No. 350/1996 Coll. on the Rules of Procedure of the National Council of the 
Slovak Republic, as amended by later legislation 
28 Sections 71 – 86 ibid. 
29 Section 70 ibid. 
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It is clear from the above brief overview that in Slovakia there is a hierarchically 
organised detailed network of formal norms dealing with the formulation 
and implementation of public policy. This set of norms has been gradually 
developing, but it shows a higher degree of stability than other formal rules of the 
game within the transition, which change rather rapidly. Together with the non-formal 
framework, the formal norms regulate the process of the formal public policy-making.  
 
The main purpose of the existence of the above rules is to regulate the operation of 
relevant entities – actors – in the process in question. Who are then the major 
„players“ in the process of public policy-making? In our view and experience, they 
can be divided into the following groups: 
• members of the government 
• MPs 
• civil servants directly involved in policy-making 
• the government’s formal corporatist counterparts  
• foreign counterparts 
• media  
• NGOs 
• local and occupation-based self-governments   
• non-formal partners and interest groups (esp. members of various decision-making 
and  advisory bodies not belonging to any of the previous groups) 
 
These groups are either formally responsible for the preparation and implementation 
of the public policy in various areas, or they seek to influence it. Their role in this 
process – except for the MPs and members of the government, is analysed in another 
chapter of this study.30 In the following part, we will focus on the process of the 
formulation and adoption of public policy itself. 
 
II.2. Process of formulation and adoption of public policy – stylised 
generalisation  
 
Even though the process of preparation and adoption of public policy varies from case 
to case, this part of the study aims to present a stylised generalisation of the process, 
in which its primary features can be observed.  
 
From the formal point of view, any significant modification of public policy31 in 
a particular area can only be approved by the government or parliament, be it in the 
form of a legislative document, policy document or even in the form of a budget 
modification. Hence, the two institutions operate as the key points, through which any 
                                                 
30 The study does not deal with the government members and MPs, because in terms of public policy-
making they do not represent an interest group, but are decision-making bodies that are being 
influenced by interest groups. Their appointment and their decision-making process are procedurally 
regulated in detail, and their mandate comes directly from the voters, to whom they give accounts 
regularly every four years. The purpose of this study is to examine the role of other participants in the 
process and in exercising influence over political representatives. 
31 Less significant modifications are frequently within the power of individual ministers or other 
representatives of public administration, be it on the basis of their authority to issue secondary 
legislation or on the basis of the structure of formal norms that gives them a room for „manoeuvring“. 
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important formal decisions about a modification of public policy in a particular area 
must pass, and which also have constitutional responsibility in this field.32 
 
With regard to a modification of public policy in a particular area, we have to 
distinguish between three key notions: impetus, sponsor and decision-making body.  
 
An impetus for a modification of public policy is an event or a factor, which led to 
presenting the proposal for the modification. This can in principle be anything: the 
government manifesto, the effort to meet election promises, emergency situation due 
to external events, media pressure caused by a particular case or scandal in 
a particular area, pressure exerted by an interest group, or an initiative originating in 
the belief in the benefits of the proposed modification or in the belief in the popularity 
of the proposal. 
 
A sponsor is a person or a group of persons that has the right of the so-called agenda-
setting, i.e. the right to formally present a proposal for deliberations of the relevant 
decision-making body – the government or the parliament. Legislation stipulates who 
can be a sponsor. For government deliberations, a proposal can be put forward by its 
members, heads of other central government agencies, the NBS Governor, the 
Prosecutor General, the head of NKÚ SR (the Supreme Audit Office of the Slovak 
Republic) and a number of other public officials. For parliament deliberations, 
proposals can only be put forward by MPs (individually, as a group, or as 
a parliamentary committee) and by the government.  
 
For this purpose, a decision-making body is the government or the parliament. In the 
case of the government, for a proposal to be passed, the simple majority of all 
members of the government have to be in its favour (at present it is 11 out of 20). In 
the case of the parliament, the simple majority of MPs present at the session is 
required33, with the exception of constitutional laws where the three-fifths majority of 
all parliament deputies is needed. 
 
The process of preparation and approval of a change in public policy in Slovakia 
recognises two primary trajectories – governmental and parliamentary. They are 
described in detail in the section below.  
 
In our country, similar to most systems with the parliamentary system of 
government34, the government dominates in the process of public policy-making. This 
general dominance is in Slovakia further strengthened by a number of factors: 
• parliament is overburdened due to the need to re-design the legislative and 
institutional framework while building market democracy, therefore it is not 
                                                 
32 To be more correct: the statement does not apply to cases when an independent body of public 
authority decides to significantly modify an area of public policy under its control, such as the National 
Bank of Slovakia and monetary policy, but mainly the judiciary, where decisions of individual courts 
as well as of the Constitutional Court can have an important impact on public policy. 
33 for parliament to be quorate, simple majority of MPs has to be present, i.e. minimum 76 deputies. 
34 in this system, the Government, as the supreme body of the executive, is the reflection of the power 
situation in the parliament, to which it reports, and on whose vote of confidence it depends (for 
maintaining the parliamentary majority). Contrary to that, for example in the USA the executive is 
separated from the legislature thanks to the direct election of the supreme representative of the 
executive – the President, and therefore the parliament itself (Congress) and individual deputies in it, 
make much more use of their right to initiate legislation.  
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possible to have any more significant political and time scope for the initiative of 
MPs; 
• the overburden has amplified, especially since 1999, due to the need to adopt 
legislation necessary for the accession to the European Union; 
• poor technical and intellectual support for parliament deputies in the preparation 
of legislative and policy documents. Until the introduction of assistant posts in 
January 2001, MPs only had minimum possibilities to build technical support for 
their work (with the exception of the Parliamentary Institute); 
• partial existence of a vicious circle in that due to all above factors the political 
leaders with the biggest zeal for public policy are mostly interested in the posts in 
the executive, because it is there where they can better realise their ambitions.  
 
The existence of this phenomenon can be quantitatively evidenced on the basis of the 
statistics on the adoption of laws in the period of 1994 – 2001. 
 
Table II.1: Adoption of laws in the National Council of the SR, 1994 – 2001  
 Number of laws 
adopted  
Number of adopted 
government bills 
Number of adopted 
MP-sponsored bills 
1994 – II. part 8 2 6 
1995 84 68 16 
1996 79 64 15 
1997 73 67 6 
1998 – I. part 69 57 12 
1998 – II. part 17 10 7 
1999 100 84 16 
2000 126 96 30 
2001 (until the 50th 
session) 
60 51 9 
Source: Office of the NC SR 
 
We can notice almost absolute dominance of the government bills as well as a gradual 
increase in the number of laws adopted that is mainly due to the EU accession process 
and that illustrates the growing overburden on the political and administrative 
capacity of the executive, which we revisit in Chapter IV. 
 
II.2. Trajectories of public policy-making 
 
II.2.1. Governmental trajectory 
 
The primary document outlining the orientation of the government and its objectives 
in the individual areas of public policy is the government manifesto, which every 
government must present to the National Council within 30 days of its appointment. 
On the basis of the manifesto, parliament passes a vote of confidence in, and gives 
mandate to, the government.  
 
The government manifesto can therefore be viewed as the mandate of parliamentary 
majority for the government to prepare and implement steps proposed in the 
manifesto. This mandate has two aspects. First of all, it is a general expression of 
confidence in the government by the majority of deputies representing – based on the 
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outcome of general election – citizens. At the more practical level, however, the 
expression of confidence based on the manifesto, can also be perceived as a non-
formal commitment of the parliamentary majority to support bills introduced by the 
government in accordance with the manifesto. 
 
Under the conditions of a coalition government – not only in Slovakia – a government 
manifesto also fulfils another non-formal, albeit a crucial, role: the role of an 
agreement between the individual political parties participating in the formation of the 
government, on its objectives and tools in the individual areas of public policy.  The 
period of preparation for the formation of the government and its manifesto should 
then be a period, during which the future participants in the government agree on the 
principal limits and ambitions of governing, which – when complied with – will make 
it possible for the government, its members and for parliament to relatively peacefully 
and productively work within the agreed confines. 
 
If a government manifesto is to successfully meet the above objectives, the following 
two conditions must be met: 
• the manifesto must be credible. In other words, all participating parties must 
believe that non-compliance with it on the part of individual members of the 
Government or deputies – unless previously agreed with other members of the 
coalition – will have significant negative implications for them. If this is not the 
case, the “rules of the game” are not being enforced; 
• the manifesto must be clear and concrete under the circumstances given by 
environment. The more vague and general political declarations or provisions, 
open to different interpretations, prevail in the manifesto, the smaller is its value 
as a binding agreement between the government and the parliament as well as 
between individual parties forming the government.35 
 
When comparing government manifestos since 1993, it can be concluded that there is 
a gradual improvement in both above areas. Despite that, upon comparison with 
government manifestos in other smaller West European countries with a similar 
political system, it can be concluded that there is a considerable room for increasing 
clarity and concreteness of government manifestos in Slovakia.  The problem in 
Slovakia, however, is a high proportion of uncertainty in both external and internal 
environment, which makes it difficult to achieve clear and detailed ex ante political 
agreements. 
 
For the sake of comparison, in Finland „in the 19th century the government manifesto 
was of a very general nature and its development did not take a long time. From the 
end of the Second World War, and especially during the last thirty years, the 
development of government manifesto became an important and frequently time-
consuming process, which includes detailed examination of options faced by the new 
government in the areas of economic and social policy, and which also includes a 
discussion with a number of experts and representatives of ministerial apparatuses… 
In that way, the government manifesto became in the 1980s - 90s a rather extensive 
document creating a public policy framework for the government during its term of 
office.“ (Selovuori (1999), p. 51) 
                                                 
35 For example in Finland the term used for government manifesto also is „the action plan of the 
government“. 
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We can equally speak about a very detailed procedure in Sweden, too. Egardt (1998) 
concludes, on the basis of the experience from the country: „If there is no joint 
political agenda that can be relied on, bigger and smaller political differences can 
easily lead to a paralysis of the government and its eventual fall.“ (p. 16) That is also 
why he illustrates, using the example of the formation of government in 1991 with 
four coalition partners, the importance of building a detailed consensus right at the 
outset. Representatives of parties together identified 147 issues, which they 
considered relevant, and in which there was no previous agreement. It was possible to 
solve 140 of them in the discussions of the parties’ representatives at lower and 
middle level. Only the remaining 7 issues were dealt with directly by the leaders of 
the parties and after agreeing on those, they could form a coalition with clearly agreed 
objectives (ibid., pp. 20–21). 
 
Table II.2: Comparison of government manifestos of the Slovak and Finnish 
governments in the years 1998 and 1999 in the field of education 
Slovak government  Finnish government 
Intended policy Intended policy  
Education development policy Free pre-school education for 6-year-olds 
New law on schools Consider lowering the age for the 
commencement of mandatory school 
attendance  
Law on financing Development of education for  "adults" 
(life-long learning) 
Reconsideration of the system of financing 
private schools 
Polytechnics’ orientation toward improving 
the quality of education 
Audit of funds utilisation by school self-
governance 
Support for structural development of 
education 
Strengthening school self-governance Public financing of Finnish innovation 
programmes 
Tax relieves for schools Support for free-of-charge cultural 
activities 
Law on civil and public service  
Services for teachers provided through 
methodology centres 
 
Devolution of pre-school facilities and 
primary schools to local government 
 
Placing more emphasis on extra-curricular 
education 
 
Analysis of the network of secondary 
schools + optimisation 
 
Standardisation of education   
Elimination of corruption in entry 
examinations 
 
Increase level of education in national 
minorities 
 
Transfer financial and personnel powers 
back to district and regional authorities 
 
Policy of the development of higher  
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education for the 21st century 
Support to the economics of higher 
education institutions (HEIs) as non-profit 
organisations 
 
Higher Education Act  
Strengthening integrity of HEIs   
Differentiation of HEIs and their internal 
diversification 
 
Development of post-graduate study  
Consider founding a catholic university  
  
Concrete measures: Concrete measures: 
Enabling HEI students to have access to 
affordable boarding, accommodation, 
transport and effective assistance in the 
form of stipends 
Examine results of experimental classes in 
higher secondary schools  
Re-introduce independent school 
inspection 
Improve students’ knowledge in 
mathematics and natural sciences 
Introduce a principle, based on which 
payments from parents and students stay at 
the school 
Carry out a high-quality analysis of 
teaching at polytechnics 
Assistance to the socially disadvantaged Develop skill tests for apprentice schools 
Change in the contents of education in 
primary schools 
Implementation of practical training 
Improve quality of final exams at HEI and 
secondary schools 
Evaluation of teachers and education on a 
nation-wide basis 
Bilingual school certificates and bilingual 
teacher records 
Reduce time needed to complete higher 
and postgraduate education 
Improve teaching of Slovak language in 
schools with Hungarian as language of 
instruction  
Establish Virtual University 
Increase the number of students in HEI Develop student grants 
Internationalisation of the current system 
of evaluation and accreditation 
Increase the baseline for grants that cover 
students’ cost of living 
Completion of student hostels Continue establishing "Centres of 
Excellence" 
Source: Government Manifesto of the Government of the Slovak Republic, November 
1998, Government Manifesto of the Government of the Republic of Finland, April 
1999 
 
The government manifesto in Slovakia is reflected in two basic planning documents 
of the government in the area of public policy – the Government‘s Work Plan and the 
Plan of the Government‘s Legislative Tasks. These annual documents are approved 
by the government at the beginning of each year and therefore they can be regarded 
not only as the implementation plan for the government manifesto, but also as the 
opportunity to complement key government priorities, set beforehand, by other tasks 
that are the result of ministers’ initiative or the result of requirements not covered in 
the manifesto. 
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On the basis of the Government‘s Work Plan and the Plan of the Government‘s 
Legislative Tasks, individual sponsors are tasked to present their proposal for the 
government deliberations in the scheduled month.  
 
The manner, in which a member of the government or another sponsor prepares the 
proposal, is fully in their authority. As a rule, the sponsor assigns the responsibility to 
an organisation unit within his/her agency. Especially in politically important or 
complex tasks, use is frequently made of joint expert groups of staff from central 
government agencies and other sponsors, or of ad hoc committees or groups working 
fully outside the central bodies.36 The draft then frequently goes through the so-called 
intra-agency review process, in which other units within the sponsor’s agency 
comment on the working version of the draft. The final version is approved at the 
meeting of top representatives of the particular central agency.  
 
Such a draft proposal could theoretically be presented by the sponsor directly to the 
government meeting that would pass it without or with modifications, or reject it. 
However, due to the fact that the government is overburdened and due to its political 
nature, such a system would not be efficient nor would it serve its purpose. Therefore 
there are several intermediate steps between the development of the so-called 
ministerial version and the introduction of the draft to the government meeting. 
 
The first such step is the so-called inter-agency review process. In the framework of this process, the 
sponsor sends the draft to all central bodies that are in any way concerned with the proposal and 
possibly to other relevant institutions as well. In practice almost every draft is sent for commenting to 
all central government agencies, deputy prime ministers and relevant non-governmental institutions 
(trade unions, employers, local and occupation-based self-government, etc.) Persons, entities and 
institutions addressed in this way, can present their comments on the draft. New rules for the inter-
agency review process have been in effect since 1 November 2001. Their main objective is to make the 
process electronic and democratic by moving a large part of it to the web, in order to make it freely 
accessible to the public.  
 
The purpose of the inter-agency review process is to elaborate the draft in its technical 
and political aspects so that the burden to the government meeting is minimised and 
conflicts are prevented. Its objective then is not to solve all differences and disputes 
between the involved institutions and members of the government, but to eliminate 
those, which can be eliminated. The differences that cannot be eliminated through 
discussions, must be decided on by the government. 
 
An important role in the process of reaching technical and political consensus on a 
presented proposal is played by the government’s advisory bodies and those of 
individual ministries. They mostly discuss the drafts before or after they go through 
the inter-agency review process, and are authorised to present recommendations to the 
ministers and the government. Their real purpose is that they represent forums, on 
which the government members, other politicians, but also interest groups and experts 
with a particular interest in the relevant field, can discuss, test reactions, but primarily 
they can seek consensus or at least a majority stance of all involved parties. Table II.3. 
illustrates the composition of ministries’ advisory bodies. As we can see, there is a 
                                                 
36 For the preparation of higher education reform strategy, the minister of education appointed a 
committee, in which the representatives of his ministry were a minority. For the preparation of central 
government audit, the Deputy Prime Minister for Economy set up a working group, in which local and 
foreign experts from outside of government dominated. 
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strong dominance of representatives of ministries and state administration. Except for 
a couple of ministries, the involvement of people from outside the government 
agencies is relatively low. 
 
Table II.3: Composition of advisory bodies of most ministries37 
Ministry of Ministry’s 
political re-
presentatives 
*  
Ministry 
representat
ives 
Subordinated 
organisations 
Other 
govern-
ment 
agency 
Public 
administrat
ion total 
External
** 
justice 11.6% 60.5% 0.0% 14.0% 86.0% 14.0% 
privatisation 36.4% 63.6% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 
transport, post 
and telecom. 
25.0% 75.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 
interior 15.6% 34.4% 18.8% 0.0% 68.8% 31.3% 
health 19.6% 29.4% 2.0% 7.8% 58.8% 41.2% 
economy 7.8% 38.3% 6.3% 26.6% 78.9% 21.1% 
construction 
and regional 
development 
13.1% 80.3% 3.3% 1.6% 98.4% 1.6% 
foreign affairs 5.6% 94.4% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 
finance 6.7% 57.8% 22.2% 6.7% 93.3% 6.7% 
education 4.8% 25.3% 6.0% 20.5% 56.6% 43.4% 
labour, social 
affairs and 
family 
4.0% 19.6% 6.0% 30.4% 60.0% 40.0% 
culture 1.2% 16.5% 11.9% 2.7% 32.3% 67.7% 
Source: central government agencies, December 2001     
* minister, deputy ministers       
** about a half of the external experts come from academic setting and the other half 
from non-governmental organisations  
 
After going through the steps described above, the proposal is presented to the 
government meeting to decide on it. With the exception of draft legislation, this is the 
final step in the process due to the role of the government as the supreme body of the 
executive. However, proposals related to key strategic documents, for which the 
sponsor or the government want to win over a broader and explicit support, are 
presented to the parliament that adopts resolutions on them (e.g. Military Strategy of 
the SR, Defence Strategy of the SR, Policy for Development of Science and 
Technology). 
 
If the proposal is a draft law, after approving it the government presents it to the 
National Council.  
 
 
II.2.2. Parliamentary trajectory 
 
                                                 
37 All ministries were asked for the data, but some have not provided the data in a suitable from   
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Parliament deputies can start an initiative to influence public policy-making mainly in 
two ways: by presenting MP-sponsored bills and proposals for resolutions of the 
National Council.  
 
MP-sponsored bills can be introduced by an MP, a group of MPs, and by committees 
of the National Council. An MP-sponsored bill is first presented to the government 
and only after the government has taken a position on it, it is discussed in the National 
Council.38 This further underlines the key role that the government plays in the 
process of public policy-making in Slovakia. On the basis of the previous experience 
we can identify primarily four basic objectives of MP-sponsored bills in Slovakia:  
• „supplementary“ legislative activity – these are bills or proposals of law 
amendments, which are not politically too controversial or relevant for legislative 
work of the government, and are either of a technical nature, or are relevant only 
for interest groups pertaining to a particular field. There is no significant 
opposition against these proposals. In this case, a deputy, or a group of them, 
propose an amendment to a law, or a new law, with the purpose of dealing with 
the particular field, and there is a high likelihood of the proposal being passed. For 
example: the proposal of a group of MPs, providing for transparency in public 
procurement, which the National Council adopted in December 2001; 
• „warning“ legislative activity – these are bills or proposals for law amendments, 
which are related to a particular politically significant topic. They represent a very 
important change in public policy in a particular area, and are mainly introduced 
by deputies who support the government, without any higher likelihood that the 
whole proposal or a bulk of it will be passed. Their purpose is to exert political 
pressure on the government to act on the issue or to subscribe to it, or the purpose 
can be to outwardly demonstrate the action power of the government-supporting 
deputies. For example: the initiative “Big Bang” presented by the political party 
KDH in 2001 (even though a number of measures were passed, all the key ones 
were either not passed, or were significantly modified); 
• „tactical“ activity – these are bills or proposals for law amendments, which are 
related to a particular politically significant topic. They represent a very important 
change in public policy in a particular area, and are introduced by opposition 
deputies, without any higher likelihood that the whole proposal or a bulk of it will 
be passed. Their purpose is to build an agenda on the part of the opposition 
politicians and to demonstrate their being different from the government. For 
example: the bill on proving the origins of one’s assets, introduced by the deputy 
R. Fico in 2001; 
• „non-partisan“ legislative activity – these are bills or proposals for law 
amendments, which are related to a particular politically significant topic. They 
represent a very important change in public policy in a particular area, and are 
introduced or supported by deputies who support the government as well as by the 
opposition deputies. Their purpose is to push forward the proposal, support for 
which is not divided along the government – opposition division line. For 
example: the Freedom of Information Act adopted in 2000. 
 
The above classification is of course significantly simplified. Moreover, due to the ex 
ante uncertainty about the destiny of the initiative, in a single MP-sponsored proposal 
there can be several objectives and strategies combined.  
                                                 
38 Section 70 of the Parliament’s Rules of Procedure  
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Another way to influence public policy through the so-called parliamentary trajectory 
are the resolutions of the National Council. In its resolution, the National Council can 
put the government under the obligation to take a particular action in public policy. 
For example, in 1994 the parliament succeeded through its resolution on water 
management policy to bind the government to incorporate the alternative water 
management strategy "Water for the Third Millennium", which was developed by 
three Slovak non-governmental organisations (Slovak Rivers Network, Slovak 
Association for Sustainable Life and Slovak Association for Nature and Landscape 
Protection (SZOPK)).  
 
The National Council of the SR in deliberating on the Report on Tourism 
Development and the National Programme for Tourism Development in the SR, in its 
Resolution No 1336 of 5th April 2001, asked the Government of the SR to present in 
October 2001 a proposal for the establishment of the National Tourism Bureau, as a 
central government agency, with the effect from 1st January 2002 (Ministry of 
Economy of the SR (2001)). 
 
The purpose of parliament resolutions is not to create a legally binding framework for 
the work of the government or other bodies of public authority, but to express, in the 
particular issue, the will of the body, on which the government, as well as other 
bodies of public authority, eventually depend, directly and indirectly. 
 
II.2.3. The procedure of the enactment of laws in the National Council of the SR 
 
The procedure of legislating in the National Council is equal for both government-
sponsored and MP-sponsored bills, with the only exception that a government’s 
position has to be requested on MP-sponsored bills.  
 
Bills go through three readings.  
 
The first reading serves the purpose of checking whether there is any will in the 
parliament to deal with the bill. This is a rather simple voting, in which the majority 
of deputies present must agree with „letting“ the bill to proceed to the second reading. 
The purpose of this provision is to enable the National Council to work efficiently – 
there is no point in the committees or the plenary dealing in detail with bills, for 
which there is no fundamental will to support them. 
 
The second reading is designed to deliberate on the bill in the parliament committees 
and to vote in the National Council plenary on the proposed amendments to the bill 
that were raised during committee deliberations. First, the National Council decides 
about allocating the bill to committees and designating the co-ordinating committee.39 
Then the committees discuss the draft, while the co-ordinating committee is the last 
one to do so. The committees’ deliberations are de facto discussions between the 
committee members and the bill sponsor.40  
 
                                                 
39 Section 74, para 1 ibid. 
40 Section 76 ibid. 
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The outcome of committee discussions is a report for the plenary of the National 
Council.41 The report first of all contains the committee’s recommendation to the 
National Council on whether to pass the bill, and secondly it contains proposed 
amendments or additions to the bill, agreed by the majority of the committee. If the 
bill was discussed in several committees, the report for the plenary is a joint one, and 
is developed by the co-ordinating committee.42 For the joint report of several 
committees, the co-ordinating committee has to also adopt its opinion on the 
proposals of other committees.43  
 
The second reading therefore is a technical mechanism, which is to increase the 
efficiency of the parliament’s work. It is not necessary for the bills to be discussed in 
all committees, especially if it is a rather specialised norm. The role of the co-
ordinating committee can be regarded as the key one. There is a double logic in it. 
Individual deputies cannot, and should not for that matter, assume their own position 
on all bills and all proposed modifications. The stance of the co-ordinating committee 
therefore plays a signalling role for the other deputies (namely for the deputies of the 
governing majority), according to which they can – but do not have to – decide when 
voting on the bill. And this, in turn, motivates the deputies in the co-ordinating 
committee to deal more in detail, and more profoundly, with the bill and its possible 
improvement.  
 
The third reading is there to correct technical errors; to push through proposed 
amendments to the bill, which are supported by at least 30 deputies; and to take a final 
decision of the majority in the National Council of the SR on whether the bill is 
enacted or not. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
41 Section 78 ibid. 
42 Section 79, para 1 ibid. 
43 Section 79, para 4 ibid. 
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CHAPTER III: KEY PUBLIC POLICY PLAYERS IN TERMS OF 
INTERESTS ADVOCACY 
 
III.1 Introduction 
 
In Chapter II we concluded that Slovakia has an elaborate hierarchical network of 
formal norms that deal with public policy formulation and implementation. The main 
purpose of the existence of these rules is to regulate the acting of the relevant entities 
– key players – within the process in question. We have identified the following 
groups on which we would like to focus in this section: 
• the government’s formal corporatist counterparts; 
• civil servants directly involved in policy-making; 
• foreign counterparts; 
• media; 
• the third sector (NGOs); 
• local and professional self-governments 
 
It is our intention to identify each group in more detail and to analyse its role and 
vested interests in public policy-making. To facilitate a better insight into public 
policy-making, we attach two charts describing an open and closed public policy-
making process. In Slovakia, the public policy-making process can to a large extent be 
described as open, which explains our choice of the key players to be analysed. 
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CHART III.1: Closed public policy-making model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
--------  Weak links and influences 
 
_____ Strong links and influences 
 
Source: UNDP (2001) 
 
 
Public distrust of politicians and problems of legitimacy of power 
Business 
groups 
and  
entities 
financing 
political 
 
 
Political  
leaders 
 
“Key players” 
and “grey 
eminences” 
Criticisms of public administration deficiencies by international institutions 
Impact of 
business 
sector on 
politics 
Disputes 
between 
politicians 
and  
inefficient 
public 
policy 
 
  40 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
--------  Weak links and influences 
 
_____ Strong links and influences 
 
Source: UNDP (2001) 
Globalisation and European integration 
People’s everyday lives 
cu
ltu
ra
l h
er
ita
ge
 a
nd
 d
em
oc
ra
tic
 tr
ad
iti
on
 
CHART III.2.: Open public policy-making model 
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In this chapter we also refer to a case study describing the enactment of Civil Service 
Act in order to illustrate and demonstrate the impacts different groups have on a 
particular significant change in public policy. 
 
III.2 Government’s formal corporatist counterparts44 
 
When we refer to the government’s formal corporatist counterparts, we imply those 
representatives of employers and employees who, together with government and state 
administration officials, form what is known as tripartite bodies. Corporatism in 
general is, admittedly, a much broader notion (cf. Chapter I). 
 
Even though the Slovak model is mostly underpinned by the German and Austrian 
models, one can nevertheless identify certain important differences. The Austrian 
model is based on the compulsory participation of employees and employers in 
professional chambers. Chamber members elect their management who thus have a 
direct democratic mandate to represent them. Despite the fact that the turnout rate in 
such elections has been gradually decreasing from 65% in the 1950s-1970s, it still 
remained at more than 30% in the 1990s (Crepaz (1995), p. 76). In Slovakia, on the 
other hand, there is no such formal democratic mandate for the representatives of 
trade unions and employers to rely on. Employers are represented by the Federation of 
Employers’ Unions and Associations (AZZZ) and employees by the Trade Unions 
Confederation (KOZ), both acting as voluntary associations. In practice, however, this 
difference is far less dramatic, as even in Austria during tripartite bargaining both 
chambers are to a large extent dominated by representatives of employers’ and 
unions’ voluntary associations, resulting in a situation very similar to that in Slovakia. 
 
Hence, AZZZ and KOZ are voluntary umbrella organisations uniting only some of the 
relevant groups and their internal arrangements and processes are no more regulated 
by laws or other regulations than those of any other non-governmental organisation. 
The only requirement under the Social and Economic Partnership Act (No. 106/1999 
Coll.) is that of representation. Under the law, the representation requirement is 
complied with by those organisations of employers and employees that45 
• associate employees/employers from most sectors of the economy; 
• associate employees/employers who employ employees jointly accounting for at 
least 10% of all employees; 
• operate in at least five administrative regions. 
 
                                                 
44 A significant body of factual material used in this section comes directly from AZZZ and KOZ.  
45 See § 2, sections 2 and 3 
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BOX III.1: Federation of Employers’ Unions and Associations 
(AZZZ) 
 
The Federation of Employers’ Unions and Associations (AZZZ) is the uppermost 
organisation of employers in the Slovak Republic (SR). AZZZ was established on 20 
March 1991 as an interest association of legal entities. Its membership base comprises 
employers’ and entrepreneurs’ unions and associations. AZZZ goals include, but are 
not limited to, “creating conditions for a dynamic growth of business in the Slovak 
Republic and for the protection and pursuit of the joint occupational, business and 
commercial interests of its members, especially during tripartite negotiations pursued 
under the reconciliation system known by the name of the Council for Economic and 
Social Accord (RHSD) with central state authorities and trade union bodies on issues 
of economic and social policies and problems addressed as part of collective 
bargaining agreements, including the General Accord.” 
 
The AZZZ membership base includes 37 unions and associations grouped into 7 
sections: 
• Slovak Board of Industrial Unions 
• Transport Section 
• Agriculture and Food Section 
• Co-operatives’ Unions 
• Small and Medium Business Unions 
• Finance and Commerce Unions 
• Municipal, Health Care and Education Unions 
 
The AZZZ supreme body is the general meeting of all member organisations. The 
AZZZ presidium is an operative management body made up of the following 
members: 
Ing. Michal ĽACH, AZZZ president (Chemosvit, a.s.) 
Ing. Silvester ADAMČA, president of Slovak Consumer Co-operatives Union 
Ing. František BRUCKMAYER, AZZZ general manager 
Ing. Ladislav VAŠKOVIČ, CSc., president of ZBP (VÚB, a.s.) 
Ing. Karol PAVLŮ, president of ZPS 
RNDr. Jozef KOLLÁR, president of ZCHFP SR (Duslo Šaľa, a.s.) 
Ing. Václav FABRICI, president of ZPD SR 
Ing. František SLÁVIK, president of ZSPS (Priemstav, a.s.) 
Ing. Jozef PITTNER, president of ZHŤPG SR (ZSNP, a.s.) 
Michal SÝKORA, president of ZMOS [Association of Towns and Communities of 
Slovakia] 
Ing. Andrej EGYED, president of ZZDPT SR (ŽSR, a.s.) 
Ing. Jozef UHRÍK, CSc. vice-president of ZSP SR (Volkswagen Slovakia, a.s.) 
 
In addition to the presidium, AZZZ also has a supervisory board that oversees its 
management and operations. 
 
Source: Federation of Employers’ Unions and Associations 
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BOX III.2: Trade Unions Confederation 
 
The Trade Unions Confederation of the Slovak Republic (KOZ SR) is a voluntary 
association of trade unions and union associations with a similar or the same status. 
The KOZ mission is to “associate trade unions and union associations in order to 
protect unionists’ rights, advocate their economic, social, cultural and other interests 
and needs that arise from, or are connected with their employment and occupations.” 
It has 42 member unions. The number of members has been declining gradually and, 
for a number of reasons, the data disclosed by KOZ cannot be regarded as entirely 
reliable. However, KOZ reports that at present its member unions have 700,504 
members, i.e. approximately 33.3% of all employees. (In 1990 the trade unions had 
2,443,977 members.) 
 
The Trade Unions Confederation has a relatively complex decision-making structure 
made up, among other things, of 
• The Convention (the KOZ supreme body convened by the KOZ Congress at least 
once in four years upon the request of at least two thirds of the Confederation 
members. It elects the KOZ president, vice-presidents, Executive Board members 
and auditors) 
• The Congress (the KOZ supreme body in between conventions; it usually meets 
once a year to discuss all Confederation activities over the past year and set 
principal objectives for the following year; the Congress is comprised of KOZ 
Board members and standing members elected by the relevant bodies of member 
trade unions using an approved formula) 
•  The Board of Chairpersons (a co-ordination body of the Confederation members 
serving as a forum to exchange information between trade unions and as a 
platform to formulate strategic decisions by KOZ; it is made up of trade union 
presidents or vice-presidents empowered by their respective unions; the KOZ 
president and vice-presidents are deemed ex officio members; the meetings of the 
Board of Chairpersons are convened by the KOZ Board as necessary but at least 
three times a year) 
• the Executive Board (the Confederation’s executive body that runs KOZ in the 
period between Congress meetings) is responsible for compliance with the KOZ 
manifesto and objectives set for a given calendar year; the Executive Board has 19 
members including the KOZ president and vice-presidents and members 
representing manufacturing and non-manufacturing trade unions; the Executive 
Board is convened by the KOZ Management Board as necessary but at least once 
a month) 
• the Management Board (a body responsible for the operational management of the 
Confederation; it consists of the KOZ president and vice-presidents and is 
convened by the KOZ president as necessary but at least once in a fortnight) 
 
The KOZ Management Board is currently made up of the following persons: 
• Ivan Saktor, KOZ president (comes from the SPOJE [Telecom] union) 
• Eugen Škultéty, KOZ vice-president responsible for trade union policies (comes 
from the KOVO [metalworkers’] union) 
• Peter Gajdoš, KOZ vice-president responsible for economic policies and social 
partnership (has a state administration background and had not been a trade union 
official before) 
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• Juraj Blahák, KOZ vice-president in charge of manufacturing unions (comes from 
the CHÉMIA [chemistry] trade union) 
• Igor Lenský, KOZ vice-president in charge of non-manufacturing unions (comes 
from the public administration trade union - SLOVES) 
 
Source: Trade Unions Confederation 
 
As a result, these top organisations are in reality controlled only by a handful of 
persons with a very low level of real and enforceable accountability towards the 
groups they are supposed to represent, i.e. employees and employers.46 This statement 
appears more pertinent in respect of employers than trade unionists. In the latter 
group, their participation in the process is often understood as a tool to promote one’s 
political career. Some of the better-known KOZ representatives are Ladislav Polka 
and František Kurej in RHSD and the late Ján Ducký in AZZZ. 
 
Under the previously described arrangement, accountability appears to be spread over 
several tiers, i.e. the part of a relevant group that is associated in a trade/employers 
union elects the management of that union, who then becomes part of an umbrella 
organisation whose management they in turn elect. The internal structure that has 
historically evolved favours groups that 
• have been organised since the 1990s (e.g. large, formerly state-owned enterprises 
in case of employers) 
• groups with a significant level of unionisation (e.g. trade unions acting in the 
public sector). 
 
It can be observed that the governing bodies of AZZZ are largely represented by the 
managers of large industrial and financial companies who also participate in the social 
partnership bodies. In the case of KOZ, one can observe that more effort is being 
made to ensure representation of all employee groups in the governing bodies by 
explicitly allocating the responsibilities of vice-presidents over different sectors and 
by the structure of other bodies. 
 
In addition to the mandate, another major feature of the corporatist system is formal 
and informal powers. 
 
In Austria there is no legislation defining the well-known Parity Commission for 
Wages and Prices that has been operating since 1957 with the aim of ensuring accord 
among social partners. The organisation is voluntary and informal. 
 
The Parity Commission is made up of representatives of the above-mentioned 
professional chambers together with the Trade Unions Confederation and government 
officials. All decisions have to be unanimous, yet there is no legal basis for enforcing 
such decisions; these are rather agreements voluntarily performed by long-term 
partners. (Katzenstein (1984), p. 61). The commission has “no address or fixed seat, 
statute, law or procedural rules, nor a list of members, written agreements, nor is it a 
legal entity” (Crepaz (1995), p. 75). 
 
                                                 
46 Before 1999, there had not even been any formal regulation of social partnership, which had 
therefore been based only on the mutual agreement of all parties involved as of 30 October 1990. 
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By contrast, since 1999 the social partnership in Slovakia has been regulated by the 
law mentioned above (Act 106/1999), which explicitly governs the partnership 
process. Under that law, social partners are required to negotiate with the government 
their standpoints concerning drafts of generally valid directives that apply to 
substantial interests of employees and employers, especially those affecting economic, 
social and working conditions as well as wages.47 Furthermore, discussions typically 
include the stances and recommendations of the interested parties concerning 
economic and social developments and the state budget.48 In other words, virtually 
any significant decision made by the government, especially one of a conceptual 
nature, is subject to negotiations with the social partners. 
 
All such issues are discussed at plenary meetings of the Council for Economic and 
Social Accord, with the participation of all the three parties. The purpose of these 
meetings is to seek agreement. 
 
Thus, the Slovak model features a combination of a weak democratic mandate, a 
lower degree of accountability of the representatives to the represented and a 
significantly higher level of formal powers. 
 
Real political power, however, cannot be secured by a place at the negotiation table 
provided by legislation. Under the law, the failure to reach agreement leads to yet 
another round of negotiations. Should the parties continue to disagree, the public 
policy-making process would proceed following standardised procedures.49 The actual 
formal power of the social partners merely consists in the ability to obstruct and 
protest against proposed measures. In 2001, an attempt at changing this situation 
failed when the government tried to increase the price of natural gas. The social 
partners would not as much as discuss the government’s motion arguing that, under 
the tripartite legislation, the government was not allowed to approve the proposal 
without tripartite negotiations. The government rejected this interpretation contending 
that it would have set a precedent permitting the social partners to obstruct any 
proposal that would not suit them. 
 
A question therefore arises as to what real influence on the adoption of social policy 
the social partners have under the tripartite system. What are the instruments for 
exercising their influence? 
 
In simple terms, that influence and associated instruments can be divided into three 
groups: 
• the General Accord 
• Negotiations over draft legislation and other proposed measures within RHSD. 
• Participation in decision-making bodies and expert review groups. 
 
General Accords are concluded by all social partners for the next calendar year, in 
which the commitments of the government, trade unions and employers are stipulated 
with regard to the economy, employment, social policies and employees’ and 
employers’ rights. General Accords were signed for each year during the period of 
                                                 
47 § 3 sec. 2 of Act No. 106/1999 Coll. 
48 Ibid.  
49 Ibid, § 6, sec. 7  
  46 
1991 to 1996, followed by a respite until 2000. No General Accord was concluded for 
2001 either. 
 
General Accords should be viewed in light of the fact that, unlike collective 
agreements, they are political rather than legal documents. Compliance with them 
could be enforced through political rather than legal means. Therefore, the 
significance of, and compliance with General Accords have varied dramatically, 
starting with the introduction of the minimum wage and associated systems in 1991 to 
largely declarative commitments in the following years. 
 
A somewhat smaller, albeit more concrete, influence is accorded to social partners by 
their “seats at the RHSD table” where most legislative and other proposals relevant to 
the interests of employers and employees are to be discussed. As noted previously, 
this arrangement by no means guarantees that views of the social partners will be 
asserted, nor does it give them the right of veto. Yet, because of the effort of most 
governments to meet social partners’ requirements whenever possible and the 
possibilities for personal lobbying, the RHSD meetings are a useful instrument for the 
social partners, providing them with opportunities to advocate their interests (or those 
of their representatives) in a number of areas.  
 
The participation of the social partners in decision-making and expert review bodies is 
perhaps the least conspicuous but, ultimately, the most concrete means of exercising 
their influence. In Chapter II, we discuss the composition of consultative bodies 
operating under the auspices of central administration authorities, where the social 
partners are significantly represented. Furthermore, the tripartite approach has been 
used in establishing the management bodies of public agencies (Social Insurance 
Company, National Labour Office, General Health Insurance Company), due to which 
the social partners hold two thirds of seats in the governing bodies of the institutions 
managing more than one third of public expenditures. Another case in point is the fact 
that KOZ has been represented in 16 working groups of Slovakia’s team engaged in 
the negotiations for EU accession.50 
 
III.3. Civil servants directly involved in policy-making 
 
The role of civil servants directly involved in public policy-making and reforms is 
primarily influenced by the following factors:51 
• Before the Civil Service Act was passed in July 200152, there had been no 
framework conducive to the establishment of a professional, unbiased and 
efficient civil service. Even with the relevant law enacted, the establishment of the 
civil service consistent with the above criteria is going to be a long-term process 
requiring the commitment of the political elite to its principles. 
• During the transition process, the supply of many aptitudes and educational 
prowess needed for public policy-making in a new democratic environment (e.g. 
high quality and up-to-date education in economics/law/political science, highly 
developed analytical and conceptual skills, the awareness of sectoral policies 
pursued by other countries, language competence, etc.) has been generally low, 
                                                 
50 The authors’ estimates based on data made available by KOZ. 
51 See Beblavý (2001) and Beblavý, Verheijen, Staroňová (2001) 
52 The Act will come into force on 1 April 2002 
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while demand for these faculties on the part of the private and public sector has 
been definitely high. Given the level of pay the public sector can afford, it has in 
many instances failed to be competitive. 
• The politicisation of the civil service has resulted in frequent reshuffles with 
regard to higher-level civil servants (general and other managers of state-owned 
organisations, general directors of sections and department directors at ministries 
and other central state authorities). 
• For these reasons, responsibility for public policy-making was gradually assigned 
to positions where politicians believed at least general prerequisites were 
complied with for proper performance, i.e. to organisations subordinated to 
central state authorities and to top civil servants at such authorities (general 
directors of sections and department directors). Compared to lower official or 
junior management jobs at central state authorities, such top positions can, thanks 
to the combination of better pay and prestige as well as greater autonomy or other 
non-pecuniary incentives, attract higher quality specialists. 
 
With regard to civil servants directly involved in policy-making, it would be difficult 
to speak of their group interests except for policies that immediately affect them such 
as the Civil Service Act and similar legislation. It would perhaps be more appropriate 
to point out three factors relevant to the influence of civil servants on public policy-
making: 
• Civil servants as representatives of their respective organisation/sector. As 
public sector employment limits the financial income of an individual, public 
institutions and their staff tend to maximise non-financial benefits, particularly 
those relating to the importance of a given institution, its overall budget and status. 
These benefits may be tangible (a larger budget is generally reflected in higher 
expenditure on office furniture and equipment, business trips, company cars etc.) 
and, especially, intangible (prestige, reputation, esteem). Therefore, and because 
of the natural tendency of individuals to identify with their environment and 
organisation, state officials tend to think and act so as to maximise the budget, 
influence and prestige of their respective organisation/sector. 
• Civil servants as representatives of interest groups in their respective fields. 
For a variety of reasons, civil servants often tend to represent and advocate vested 
interests in their respective fields. In particular, this is a result of frequent 
exposure to interest groups operating in the sector, own occupational background, 
and business and personal relations with their representatives. By way of an 
example, civil servants in the education sector may tie public education policies 
with upholding teachers’ group interests etc. This trend becomes ever more 
pronounced when politicians are not able or willing to present to civil servants a 
clear philosophy/vision of public policies in a given sector. This is then supplanted 
by inputs from interest groups that nearly always have a vision of their own. 
• Civil servants’ personal beliefs are important for public policies formulation 
but impossible to predict in a systematic manner. 
 
Civil servants can exercise the greatest influence during the preparatory stages of 
public policy-making at their respective ministries or central state authorities and 
during the inter-ministerial process of comments. As the public policy-making process 
progresses to subsequent stages, civil servants’ influence diminishes or remains small. 
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III.4. Foreign counterparts 
 
Foreign counterparts in reform may include countries (for Slovakia, the relevant ones 
being the US, Germany, the UK, Austria, Canada and The Netherlands) and 
multilateral organisations and their bodies (the European Union with its bodies – the 
European Commission, the European Parliament, the European Council; the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, the 
Council of Europe, Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe etc.). 
 
In contemplating the influence of foreign counterparts on reform in transition 
economies in general and in Slovakia in particular, one should conceptually 
distinguish between two notions: 
• reforms that mimic, either in part or fully, systems operating in other countries 
• reforms implemented as a result of influence/pressure from foreign counterparts. 
 
These two notions do not necessarily overlap. One can conceive of reform that 
mimics a foreign model but is elicited by purely domestic pressures. Similarly, one 
can conceive of reform prompted by pressure from foreign counterparts but 
representing an autonomous system not inspired by foreign models.53 However, these 
two types of reform are fairly rare; moreover, we are unaware of a major example of 
the latter type in Slovakia. Therefore, the two notions mostly overlap and one can 
refer to reform supported and inspired by foreign counterparts at the same time. 
 
In this regard Jakoby (2001) writes of “tutors” and “pupils”, implying not only that a 
pupil learns facts and opinions from the tutor but also suggesting a certain power that 
the tutor exercises when dealing with the pupil. In the same context, Jakoby points out 
two types of such (not entirely voluntary) reform that he describes as “thresholds” and 
“fine-tuning”. A threshold is a “qualitative and subjective view of the minimum 
standards that new formal structures should meet” to ensure the country’s membership 
of an international organisation (p. 181). The most common and extensive process of 
threshold creation is the preparation for European Union accession in respect of which 
the EU has identified a list of political and economic criteria that new members 
should meet. There is a less explicit, albeit just as real, threshold for membership in 
NATO, OECD and some other “elite” clubs. Fine-tuning, on the other hand, means 
the use of “western models in order to apply … relatively minor adjustments as part of 
major institutional changes” (ibid). 
 
Concerning the interests and role of foreign counterparts in Slovakia’s reforms, the 
following factors should be highlighted. 
 
The first one is the varied and competitive nature of views held by foreign 
counterparts, which is offset by their partial specialisation. In addition to a number of 
countries, the foremost foreign counterparts of Slovakia’s reform have been the 
European Union and NATO followed by the IMF and the World Bank and, to a 
somewhat lesser degree, the Council of Europe and OSCE. This amounts to more than 
a dozen counterparts that naturally tend to advocate diverse solutions, mostly based on 
                                                 
53 Even where the substance of reform is initially based on largely home-grown ideas, foreign 
involvement will ultimately be reflected in pressure concerning the substance of the reform (see the 
case study of the Civil Service Act) 
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their own experience or codified “best practices”. In reality, this may lead, and has 
led, to a clash between recommendations made by different counterparts. The fact that 
such cases have not become a rule is a result of counterparts’ specialisation and their 
usual attempts at co-ordination. Having said this, competition in reform is an 
important element where it has enabled domestic reformers to make comparisons and 
choices between diverse views on a particular area. 
 
The other factor concerns incentives behind involvement in reform. In simple terms, 
the main incentive for bilateral and multilateral involvement is the transfer of own 
values through implementing changes to formal and informal institutions, i.e. to the 
rules of the game. Admittedly, the extent and specific nature of incentives vary on a 
case-by-case basis and depend on the counterparts’ concrete goals. For the purpose of 
this publication and with regard to Slovak realities, one can distinguish between two 
primary incentives – open-ended aid and aid to help obtain membership. The former 
instance is typical for some multilateral institutions (such as the IMF, World Bank, 
UNDP) that have a general mandate to monitor the situation in a group of countries 
and to assist them in improving it. The latter type of partnership is, by contrast, about 
meeting requirements for both formal and functional membership of a club. 
Therefore, assistance pertaining to the latter type tends to be more detailed, rigid and 
utilitarian. The most evident example would be the harmonisation, especially through 
amendments to legislation, of formal institutions during the EU accession process. For 
instance, the harmonisation goal in the banking sector is not only to put in place a 
high-quality institutional infrastructure for the sector but also to ensure that the 
infrastructure is consistent with the European Union’s internal market. 
 
With regard to foreign influences, it is essential to note a differentiated typology of 
instruments used to exercise such influence. Counterparts differ, among other things, 
in the instruments they can employ to encourage a country and its leaders to pursue 
recommended reforms. The three most common instruments are membership, funding 
and “praise”. We have already referred to the offer of membership as an instrument of 
eliciting change in public policies in connection with the “threshold” that should be 
reached to warrant an invitation to join. This incentive is primarily used by the EU 
and NATO and, to a lesser degree, by the OECD and the Council of Europe. Funding 
represents another instrument provided in the form of grants, gifts or loans made 
available under terms and conditions that are more convenient than those of 
commercial loans. This instrument is primarily used by the European Union, 
International Monetary Fund and World Bank. With regard to the EU, this instrument 
is used in the varied form of dozens, perhaps even hundreds, of projects under 
programmes such as PHARE, ISPA or SAPARD. In respect of the IMF or World 
Bank, it would be more appropriate to speak of large one-off projects. The use of 
“praise” or “endorsement” as an instrument is perhaps the subtlest of all. Here a 
foreign counterpart would typically praise a particular aspect of domestic public 
policy or the overall course the country is following. “Praise” and “endorsement” are 
often used in combination with other instruments, e.g. in the long-term process of EU 
accession the annual reports of the European Commission on progress made by 
candidate countries can be construed as short-term and flexible encouragement 
signals. However, this instrument also exists in its pure form, especially if applied by 
financial institutions. For instance, participants of international capital markets find it 
extremely difficult and inefficient to furnish and evaluate their own data about 
economic and political developments in small and underdeveloped countries. “The 
  50 
endorsement” of policies, be it explicit in the form of an IMF report or implicit in the 
form of a World Bank loan, may send a signal or serve as a seal of approval 
suggesting to investors that certain standards have been met. This was to a large 
extent the reason for having taken the EFSAL loan to restructure the banking sector 
(Slovakia could borrow the money also from capital markets; however, this would 
have been more expensive and would not have reassured investors buying the 
remainder of treasury bonds that the country was following a sound economic course). 
 
The last important factor that should be taken into account is the use of foreign 
counterparts by domestic elites to impose unpopular measures or implement some 
painful change. Especially where the domestic media and the public in general 
support membership of an organisation and/or think highly of it, foreign counterparts 
prove to be a useful instrument for domestic elites. They serve not only as 
“scapegoats” but also as “battering rams”. Using them as a battering ram makes it 
possible to exert pressure upon politicians, political parties as well as institutions and 
civil servants and to break through complicated networks of inhibitions and vested 
interests that would otherwise reliably prevent the implementation of such changes. 
The European Union accession process is admittedly the most common example (see 
Box III.3). Another, not so well-known, example of using foreign inputs by domestic 
elites is the IMF Staff-monitored Program (SMP) for 2001-2002 under which 
Slovakia made commitments with respect to the Fund to implement a series of 
reforms.  The program was advocated by those members of the ruling elite who 
wanted to exert external pressures to help accomplish reform or maintain a tight fiscal 
policy in the run-up to elections.54 
 
Box III.3: Commentary on the use of foreign counterparts to advocate 
unpopular changes 
 
There appears to be a deepening rift between politicians and voters in both parts of 
Europe. While elites are increasingly in favour of the unification of the entire continent, 
ordinary folks on either side of what used to be the Iron Curtain are viewing the project 
with much less enthusiasm. Political analysts warn that unless the enlargement of western 
Europe eastwards is not managed properly, the process may be easily undermined by a 
lack of support from rank-and-file voters. This would have disastrous implications for 
Slovakia, which is still unshielded by either of the West’s protective umbrellas – NATO 
or the EU – and we should learn our lesson from such a possibility. Western politicians 
have to persuade the population in their countries that the course they are proposing 
would bring benefits for them as well. In the East, politicians must learn not to use the 
threat of losing EU or NATO membership to bludgeon their population into taking a 
particular course of action. Before the previous elections, Slovakia’s present rulers were 
selling themselves to their constituencies as Brussels’ favourites. Their message was – if 
you want to join Europe, we are the vehicle to get you there, unlike HZDS or SNS. Given 
the gradual change in the attitudes of many voters, the politicians must stop using the 
popular theme of association with Europe to boost their popularity and to advocate 
otherwise unpopular changes. On the contrary, they should learn to sell EU and NATO 
membership to the general public. Barring that, European integration may become just 
one more of those good things that Slovak people do not want. 
 
Source: SME daily, 14 October 1999 
                                                 
54 They were keen to impose even tougher terms and conditions for so-called stand-by loans 
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III.5. The third sector 
 
By April 2001, Slovakia’s Ministry of Interior had registered 16,849 non-
governmental organisations, i.e. citizens’ associations, foundations, non-investment 
funds and non-profit organisations. This group includes sport, cultural, leisure time 
and professional organisations, which are often not identified as the third sector 
organisations. It should also be pointed out that not all organisations that have been 
registered are indeed active. The table below offers a more detailed breakdown of 
NGOs: 
 
Table III.1: Summary of NGOs registered in Slovakia 
Legal form Number % 
Foundation 479 2,8 
Citizens’ association 15,984 94.9 
Non-investment fund 281 1.7 
Non-profit organisation 105 0.6 
Total 16,849 100 
Source: Slovak Ministry of Interior, spring 2001 
For the purpose of this study, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) can be divided 
into those providing services55, those engaged in civil advocacy56 and those best 
described as think-tanks. This study will not deal with the first group. It should also 
be pointed out that drawing a clear line between civil advocacy and direct 
involvement in policy-making would be a daunting and imprecise exercise. 
 
According to Demeš (2000), civil advocacy consists in organised efforts and activities 
by individuals and their organisations that use democratic instruments to draft and 
implement norms and laws aiming to foster a fair and equitable society. Advocacy 
instruments include a variety of civil activities (public awareness and education 
activities for individuals, petitions, campaigns, civil unrest etc.), elections, mass civil 
mobilisation, lobbying, bargaining and judicial action. 
 
Think-tanks are research and analytical institutions with the potential to conduct 
public policy research and to advocate and implement particular proposals. They thus 
contribute to shaping public policies. In Slovakia,57 think-tanks began to emerge after 
1989, with the aim of upholding the development of democratic and market-oriented 
institutions and promoting reform. In the early days of the transition, they were 
perceived as “independent” research institutions. Think-tanks were established as an 
alternative to former research centres influenced by the old regime where the chances 
of their reform were too slim and a reform drive was lacking. Another factor that had 
influenced the emergence of think-tanks was lack of confidence of the reformist 
government in the civil service (administration) it had inherited from the old regime. 
The education attainments of most civil servants were inadequate to make them 
proponents of reform. There was also a personal aspect posing a problem, as many 
“old-regime” civil servants felt threatened in their positions, which in turn 
                                                 
55 According to SAIA-SCTS data (Demeš, 2000), the first group of NGOs is Slovakia’s largest as many 
third sector organisations focus on working with young people; this is followed by education and 
research, with humanitarian activities and charities being number three.  
56 The Slovak name has been derived from civil advocacy groups in English  
57 The emergence of pro-reform think tanks is not a purely Slovak phenomenon. Krastev (2001) reports 
that words such as “free market”, “liberal”, “democratic”, “civil” and “reform” are to be found in 31 
out of 101 names of institutions in central and eastern Europe. 
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strengthened their “anti-reform” attitudes. A weak public policy-making capacity 
within political parties and the undersized academic potential of universities also 
made room for the growth of think-tanks. In the early nineties, the factors that 
influence consistent decision-making, public policy-making and formulation – 
research, recommendations, and advice – were virtually non-existent. 
 
Ever since their inception, Slovakia’s NGOs have focused on direct public policy-
making and/or, indirectly, on influencing public policies. Depending on the specific 
needs in a given area of research, many NGOs have proved active as policy-makers. 
They have been proposing various systemic measures and advocating their 
implementation through a variety of activities. Especially in the early days of the 
transition, many think-tanks were involved in exploring specific public policy areas 
and introducing new topics into public life. The topics they raised required special 
expertise and were difficult to promote politically because of their short-term 
implications. In that period think-tanks were genuine innovators. Many founders of 
think-tanks in Slovakia had been educated abroad and later became catalysts and 
advocates of change needed to reform society. The human capacity of think-tanks was 
strengthened by those politicians who, after 1992, moved away from active politics 
and into the third sector. A case in point was MESA 10, a citizens’ association 
founded and, for a period of time, headed by such active politicians as Ivan Mikloš 
and Gabriel Palacka. Paradoxically though it may seem, think-tanks were able to reap 
the benefits of political instability and political upheavals in Slovakia in the nineteen-
nineties that were greater than in the other V4 countries, namely in the form of first-
rate staff they thus managed to attract. Working with the media facilitated the 
exploration of new topics and was conducive to public discussion. Like society as a 
whole, the media were lacking an expertise base and capacity needed for analytical 
journalism. This translated into their greater openness to cooperation with think-tanks. 
The activities of think-tanks were aimed at writing articles, studies and organizing 
workshops. Enhancing general awareness through expert reviews conducted by think-
tanks contributed to the realisation that change was essential. This type of activities 
focusing on the advocacy of change was a reflection of the political scene during the 
Mečiar government, which was not particularly inclined to cooperate with think-
tanks. 
 
However, the position, responsibilities and focus of Slovakia’s NGOs have gradually 
been changing. Changes in the role of NGOs are associated, among other things, with 
the growth of the private sector that has assumed many of the responsibilities and 
become another actor in setting and enforcing the rules of the game. The critical mass 
has been growing of entrepreneurs who are beginning to realise their concern for 
clearly defined rules and are participating in their formulation. The new development 
is that, unlike in the past dominated by one-off games (e.g. privatisation), recurring 
games are prevailing now. A recurring game is the case when it is more appealing to 
entrepreneurs to have clear rules that apply to recurring situations, thus influencing 
costs, including transaction costs, and hence profit (e.g. ensuring a minimum number 
of business regulations). At the same time, the private sector is becoming involved in 
the activities previously pursued by think-tanks. This has been prompted by growing 
demand for many services earlier provided by think-tanks - as many of their activities 
have gradually become commercially attractive and migrated from a non-profit to a 
for-profit basis. Examples include economic analyses, journals, campaigns run by 
private PR agencies or sociological surveys. 
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Another shift can be observed in the substantive focus of research. This is reflected, 
on the one hand, in the emergence of politically affiliated NGOs and issue-oriented 
NGOs. Other important features include a shift towards local needs, the globalisation 
phenomenon and a greater focus on networking, i.e. more intensive co-operation with 
more domestic and foreign NGOs. As regards the emergence of politically affiliated 
NGOs58, this shift has been from “independent” institutions towards ones with a 
party-politics component in their activities. Examples include the Democracy 
Foundation, the Institute for Solidarity Society and the Conservative Institute.59 Party 
-affiliated NGOs specialise in drafting public policy proposals and preparing 
analytical studies.60 Issue-oriented NGOs deal with clearly defined issues such as 
protection of human rights, environmental protection, tax cuts, promoting 
transparency or fighting corruption. 
 
NGO activities are also undergoing changes. Recently, NGOs have been showing 
more interest in, and ability for, participation in the formulation and implementation 
of systemic changes, either though co-operation with the government or on their own. 
 
During the Dzurinda government, there have been several attempts at so-called 
partnership, i.e. the government co-operation with NGOs. This could be done in 
several forms, both formal and informal. At the Cabinet level, the Government 
Council for NGOs was created, being presently chaired by deputy prime minister Pál 
Csáky. Its members include representatives of some NGO groups, e.g. Donors’ Forum 
or Ekofórum. Council members include 15 state administration officials and 20 NGO 
representatives61. The Council is an institute for the government to engage the third 
sector in official talks. It is a platform to discuss issues pertaining to the third sector’s 
internal activities. In addition to co-operation aiming to influence the internal 
environment of the third sector, it offers opportunities for NGO experts to become 
formally involved in the deliberations of consultative bodies that deal with public 
policy-making in a given institution. As a result, many think-tank representatives are 
members of consultative bodies in public administration institutions. Such institutions 
have yielded diverse results. Some of them meet regularly, some others may have 
been convened just a couple of times since their inception and their involvement is 
purely formal. Co-operation may also take the form of drafting policy documents that 
serve as the basis for the government action in a given area. For example, a draft of 
the National Program for Fighting Corruption was prepared by Transparency 
International Slovakia. Co-operation with INEKO (Institute for Economic and Social 
Reform) in the government-sponsored audit of state administration resulted not only 
in performing the audit itself and drafting a policy material on the issue but also 
included the involvement of INEKO experts in proposing corrective measures ensuing 
from the audit. 
                                                 
58 They are also known in other countries, e.g. in Germany (Friedrich Ebert or Nauman Stiftung) or the 
US (the Heritage Foundation or National Democratic Institute). 
59 NGOs affiliated with political parties have also emerged in other fields, e.g. the SMER Foundation or 
Markíza Foundation. 
60 Demeš (2001) reports, however, that the sector is increasingly concerned about the need for a 
broader discussion on ethical standards and transparency, especially with regard to NGO funding. 
Discussions about NGO transparency and the ethics of their relations with political parties should 
attract more attention as there is increasing co-operation between foundations and political parties or 
parties themselves set up foundations (e.g. Nadácia Smer, Nadácia Markíza, Nadácia Demokracia etc.) 
61 Demeš (2001)  
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NGOs are also carrying on civil advocacy activities attempting to launch public 
discourse and are aiming to implement proposals in the form of laws without working 
directly with the government. As an example, one can quote the advocacy campaign 
to promote the Freedom of Information Act. Coercive campaigns have been staged by 
environmental NGOs. Another phenomenon has been the emergence of so-called 
GONGOs,62 i.e. NGOs working in different forms with the aim of supporting the 
government or providing services for it. Sometimes this may even lead to a lesser 
degree of criticism. 
 
One should also take into account how Slovak NGOs are seen from abroad and how 
they are linked with their foreign counterparts. NGO representatives regularly 
participate in international conferences, co-operate and hold discussions with 
international organisations, thus adding yet another dimension to the overall image of 
Slovakia. Slovak think-tanks often co-operate with the World Bank and OECD. In 
2000, the Institute for Public Affairs and SFPA initiated the setting up of the Visegrad 
Forum of Think-tanks. 
 
BOX III.4: Freedom of Information Act – Origins and Advocacy 
 
Since 1989, the idea of ensuring free access to information has been filtering to Slovakia 
through a variety of channels. For example, in 1997, the Centre for Economic 
Development organised a workshop where David P. Frankel made a detailed presentation 
to the general public describing the US Freedom of Information Act. The need for 
legislation governing access to information was also reiterated by the Mečiar government 
in its “Clean Hands” programme (1994-1998). Lacking political will, though, the 
commitments remained on paper only. 
 
After 1998, four initiatives were launched aiming to draft a Freedom of Information Bill 
and ensure its enactment. The four initiatives were drawing on similar sources. This fact 
notwithstanding, they varied in content and represented diverse views on how extensive 
the freedom of information should be. Compared to the previous periods, which had 
lacked commitment to such legislation, the focus of discussion on the issue shifted to a 
stage aiming to decide on what the contents of such legislation should be. 
 
In 1999, a group of non-governmental non-profit organisations concerned with freedom 
of information issues initiated the emergence of the Civil Initiative (CI) for a Sound 
Freedom of Information Act. They chose several instruments to advocate the enactment 
of the proposed law. Nine Civil Principles of a Sound Freedom of Information Act 
supported by more than 120 civil organisations representing over 100 thousand members 
became the basis of their effort. The initiative was also backed by several dozen media 
and journalists. The main principle became the motto of the entire campaign: “What Is 
Not Secret Should Be Public!” The principles were based on civil organisations’ 
experience and needs, on the principles and standards used in the legislation of other 
democracies or in international treaties as well as on the experience of neighbouring 
countries in implementing similar legislation. They passed though two rounds of public 
review and comments, with each new draft made available on the web. 
 
At nearly the same time, the freedom of information issues came to the attention of 
                                                 
62 From the English term governmental non-governmental organisations 
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several MPs, namely Ján Langoš and, independently from him, Ján Budaj and Ivan 
Šimko. Even though Langoš as well as Budaj and Šimko had been drawing on the Czech 
Freedom of Information Act of May 2000, they each drafted their own bill. The Ministry 
of Justice, too, set out to draft their own bill. 
 
The CI initially sought to bring about agreement on a joint draft of the bill. The CI was 
adamant that MPs fully reflect the Nine Civil Principles. Contrary to public statements 
made by both parties, the MPs were not able to cooperate properly and eventually both 
Ivan Šimko and Ján Budaj expressed serious reservations against some of the Civil 
Principles. Ultimately, the CI stopped cooperating with those MPs. 
 
The CI was monitoring the drafting of the government-sponsored Freedom of 
Information bill and attempted to incorporate amendments within the inter-ministerial 
process of comments. The ministry, however, did not respond to fundamental criticisms 
by the CI. 
 
After its failing attempts to cooperate with several actors involved in drafting and 
advocating the enactment of several freedom of information bills, at the end of October 
the CI decided to draft a civil Freedom of Information bill using available incomplete 
drafts. They were able to win over MP Ján Langoš who pledged to submit to Parliament 
the civil draft bill prepared by CI lawyers. Ivan Šimko had first intended to submit his 
own version of the draft bill as well but later gave up the idea. 
 
After the civil bill was submitted to Parliament, it was subjected to the inter-ministerial 
process of comments. Comments made by different ministries were deliberated by the 
Government’s Legislative Board, which proposed changes that would erode the 
underlying principles of the bill. The Cabinet eventually adopted this negative stance.In 
January, the civil draft bill went through the first reading. MPs assigned the bill to all 
parliamentary committees and, given its specific nature, postponed deliberations of the 
bill within the committees until April 2000. 
 
To advocate the enactment of the bill, the CI decided to stage a media campaign. In the 
meantime, the Civil Initiative prepared, in collaboration with Hlava 98 [Chapter 98], a 
civil association, theme postcards that the general public were encouraged to send to the 
chairman of Parliament in support of the sound law. Through a network of participating 
organisations, the postcards were made available in many towns and communities and 
Jozef Migaš [the chairman of Parliament] received several thousand of them. Some two 
thousand more cards were sent in through the Internet. Radio and television 
advertisements were also used to promote the Freedom of Information bill. Activists 
participated in public discussions and cooperated with media in preparing relevant 
articles. 
 
Activists presented the standpoint of civil organisations and CI legal experts to all 
parliamentary committees at all their sessions concerning this draft bill. They monitored 
proposed amendments and prepared supporting arguments. Before the bill was submitted 
to the second reading, activists prepared for MPs a summary of proposed amendments 
highlighting those that could be accepted and those that might undermine the bill. At the 
entrance to the Parliament building, MPs were hailed by several dozen demonstrators 
wearing T-shirts with assorted letters reading together “What Is Not Secret Should Be 
Public!” and a group of activists was monitoring deliberations inside Parliament. The 
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MPs eventually accepted most amendments consistent with the proposals of the Civil 
Initiative. 
 
The last step was to ensure that the bill is signed by the President to become law. 
Although the Legislative Department of the President’s Office had several reservations 
concerning the approved bill, after consultations with CI experts and a personal meeting 
with CI representatives Rudolf Schuster ultimately signed off on the bill. 
 
The final wording of the Freedom of Information Act incorporated virtually all of the 
civil principles. All versions of the proposed principles and the text of the bill were 
available on the web. The initiative saw to it that the bill was widely reviewed and that 
suggested improvements were incorporated. 
 
Many NGOs have taken up the task of implementing the Freedom of Information Act. 
They monitor the conduct of public administration authorities when processing both 
active and passive information requests, train public and civil servants, other NGOs and 
media. Some NGOs provide legal assistance in dealing with specific cases and during 
court proceedings. 
 
 
 
III.6. Media 
 
In a democracy, media are expected to perform several functions. It is through the 
media that citizens’ constitutional right to information is exercised, thus enabling 
them to indirectly participate in the governance of public affairs.63 The media provide 
a daily summary of domestic and international news. They are often regarded as 
citizens’ “extended hand” supervising the governance of public affairs and are 
perceived as democracy’s watchdogs warning against any abuse of power. Many 
scandals publicly debated in Slovakia have been initially disclosed by media. On the 
basis of the Freedom of Information Act, many media regularly turn to government 
agencies for data and monitor their activities such as the granting of subsidies by the 
Ministry of Economy or Ministry of Agriculture. The number of pieces on corruption 
published by Slovak printed media is an indicator of their interest in “supervising” the 
governance of public affairs. As shown by the following graph, the media have shown 
an increasing interest in corruption issues. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
63 The Slovak Freedom of Information Act has been in effect since 2001. For details, see Section III.5.  
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Graph III.3: Articles on corruption published by Slovak printed media 
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Note: *estimate on the basis of data for the first six months of 2001. 
Source: Information on the Evaluation of Compliance with Plans for Fighting 
Corruption. The Government of the SR, 2001. 
 
Media thus influence the substance and focus of the political agenda, open public 
discussions on various topics and highlight many politically significant areas. In 
connection with the above, it can be noted that media influence the shaping of public 
interests and participate in the advocacy of individual or group interests of political 
parties, financial and economic groups. They enable the opening of a particular topic 
and serve as an instrument that makes it possible to influence policy-makers and 
advocate new rules pertaining to the administration of public affairs. At the very least, 
they create positive or negative PR stimuli for any change or reform. At the same 
time, opinion-making media participate in shaping the image and role of public 
figures. In simplified terms, this contributes to forming individuals’ perception of a 
given public figure in a particular way, which affects their attitudes more than 
concrete actions of such a person. This public figure may be labelled a “human rights 
advocate”, “reformer”, “independent expert”, “good Christian”, “nationalist” etc. A 
change instilled by the media in the perception of a public figure by individuals shows 
little flexibility for a certain period of time. 
 
Many media position themselves in a way that makes them appealing to a particular 
segment of society in terms of their political opinions. As an example, one can refer to 
SME, “just the right paper”, Nový deň, a HZDS daily, or the weekly Slovo, which 
presents views of left-wing parties. 
 
There are several factors, however, which determine whose agenda the media present 
and in what manner. In the following text we will deal with some of them in more 
detail. 
 
The failure of the state to ensure the enforceability of law is just one such factor. A 
specific feature of the transition period is that society operates in an institutional 
framework that lacks adequate regulation and functionalities. Previous formal rules 
and organisations that used to formally enforce those rules in everyday life either do 
not apply or are nor longer operational, while new ones are either non-existent or yet 
to become fully operational and functional. At the same time, many institutions (e.g. 
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the repressive chain starting with supervision and ending with the police action, the 
prosecutor’s office and the judiciary) are yet to adapt to the requirements of a modern 
democracy and, moreover, are perceived as corrupt. This situation translates into poor 
enforceability of law and the associated risks of behaviour that is at variance with 
good morals.64 Confidence in the ability of the official system to function properly 
remains low, which is why many scandals end up on journalists’ desks rather than 
with police investigators. On many occasions, the ability of journalists to advance the 
investigation of scandals is exaggerated; however, the very fact that substantial 
pressure exerted by media contributed to the resignation of four ministers in the 
Dzurinda Cabinet is a sufficient evidence of the available potential. 
 
Another implication of the state’s failure manifested in the poor enforceability of law 
is that we operate in an environment where the odds are fairly high of a defamation 
campaign targeted against any person. 
 
The content of presented information is also influenced by media owners. Electronic 
media operate within what is known as a dual system. The dual system should ideally 
offer to the public two independent sources of information presented by public service 
electronic media on the one hand and privately owned radio and television stations on 
the other. With the 58% share of the television broadcasters market, the private 
television channel Markíza holds a unique position. The situation is expected to 
change after the launch of a new television channel Global. In addition to the number 
of electronic or print media, the ownership structure of private media is another 
relevant factor that secures diversity of opinion. Mistríková and Žitný (2001) report 
that nowadays the ownership of media is virtually impossible to trace and the public 
has practically no way of determining who actually owns a particular medium from 
which it receives information shaping one’s views (or how that medium is positioned 
in terms of ownership). Significantly, the transparency of ownership in the private 
media sector is fairly important as it enables, in case of a crisis, to correlate the 
media’s attitudes with the interests of media owners. 
 
In addition to the ownership transparency, another remarkable phenomenon is the 
direct connection of politics and the media if the media owners become politically 
active. In a report covering the period from 22 April to 21 September 2001, the non-
governmental organisation MEMO 98, which regularly publishes its findings of 
monitoring news coverage, unveiled that the news coverage of the TV channel 
Markíza is slanted towards ANO, the political party of Pavel Rusko [the owner of a 
major stake in the channel – Translator’s note]. It further noted that the political party 
ANO was presented in the Markíza news almost exclusively in a positive light. Out of 
15 references to that party, 13 were positive and only two were negative. Markíza was 
by far less favourably disposed to the remaining fourteen parties. Of all references to 
the 14 parties, there were only 20 positive and 187 negative ones.65 
 
The economic independence of private media funded by advertising is another 
important parameter. Slovakia has seen attempts at politically motivated reallocation 
of advertising money by companies affiliated with the government to politically 
“loyal” media as well as corporate pressure by “big-time” players. To retain 
                                                 
64 Since many rules are yet to be codified in the form of laws, the subset “illegal” would not capture the 
substance of the problem. 
65 SME, 29.9.2001 
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advertising income generated by a “strong” corporate customer, media would refrain 
from speaking negatively about the company’s activities. Large corporate customers 
are seeking to influence public opinion through professional public relations agencies. 
Attempts to influence the substance of presented information are not confined to 
advertising. Corporate customers are influencing the substance of information not 
only through media owners but also by way of journalists. The Code of Public 
Relations Ethics adopted on 14 October 1997 by the general meeting of the PR 
Association in the Slovak Republic states that the use of modern communications 
media and methods that enable influential contact with millions of people provides 
public relation professionals with power that should be regulated by compliance with 
a strict code of ethics. As Mistríková and Žitný (2001) report, however, the meaning 
that these notions have in the professional PR language is quite different from 
Slovakia’s present realities. 
 
Political parties also exploit possibilities offered by the use of advertising to comment 
on developments in society. This is not confined to promoting personalities affiliated 
with political parties. After the findings were unveiled of the Supreme Audit Office 
(SAO) inquiry into a scandal suggesting mismanagement of EU funds at the 
Government Office, which had caused the resignation of deputy prime minister 
Hamžík, several dailies featured a paid-for notice reading “The SAO has disproved 
embezzlement of EU funds at the Government Office.”66 However, those who took 
the effort to read through the official SAO report did not find any such statement 
there. 
 
The political independence of public service media is shaped by the regulator. Under 
Slovak law, members of the regulatory authority are elected by Parliament. Parliament 
has the right to elect and replace general managers of public service institutions. This 
arrangement makes any such manager politically dependent. For instance, the present 
general manager of STV is the eleventh since the institution was established in 1991. 
 
Another link in the chain that shapes the substance of news presented by the media is 
embodied in the journalist and his or her professionalism, training, attitudes and 
views. The period after 1989 has seen the emergence of new media and “new faces” 
who, as was thought, would not be burdened by the legacy of the previous regime. 
Media were also employing journalists with longer track records in the industry. 
 
In principle, there is a difference between news coverage, commentaries, analyses or 
findings of investigative journalists. As far as the news coverage is concerned, media 
deal with many developments only superficially, either because of the lack of interest 
in the given area or lack of specific journalistic expertise. With regard to 
commentaries and analyses, the media have gradually accumulated a critical mass of 
pro-reform columnists, who contribute to a pro-reform environment, also thanks to 
their co-operation with think-tanks. 
 
As in other areas, the media also experience an increasing pluralism of attitudes to 
reform steps, which is reflected in commentaries and analyses presented by those 
media. In addition to internal stances and educational background, the presented 
attitudes are also influenced by pressures from the media, i.e. media owners. At the 
                                                 
66 SME, 3.11.2001 
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same time, journalists are often influenced by various economic and political interest 
groups. According to Mistríková and Žitný (2001), in certain instances a journalist 
may also own a PR agency and thus help advocate the interests of his or her clients. 
Reasons for such behaviour include financial incentives where a journalist would like 
to earn a little extra money and would not mind being hired by a private business. As 
the authors further note, one can see a journalist becoming, either because of money 
or as a matter of prestige, an unofficial adviser of a politician or entrepreneur. That 
journalist would then comment in the media on steps that he or she originally 
proposed to the entrepreneur or politician. 
 
A congress of the Slovak Syndicate of Journalists approved, as early as on 19 October 
1990, a Code of Ethics, thus subscribing to the democratic tradition of European 
journalism. However, ethics remain to be a matter of a journalist’s personal attitude as 
there is no public pressure, or a sense of professional journalistic reputation, that 
would safeguard or advocate journalistic ethics. The need for an “ethics committee” 
that would enforce compliance with the code of ethics in everyday journalism and 
would, in the eyes of the general public, be a credible institute for dealing with a lack 
of ethics in the work of journalists remains, 12 years since the transition began, just 
another moot point. 
 
III.7. Professional and local self-government 
 
The substance of activities pursued by professional interest groups in a particular 
public policy area is in the attempts at shaping and influencing public opinion, public 
policies and the political decision-making process by decision-makers such as 
ministries or the National Council [Parliament]. Representatives of particular 
professions/occupations get together to advocate the interests of their respective 
groups. For example, this includes a whole range of professions and occupations 
employed in the health sector, lawyers, teachers and farmers. Group interests that they 
represent vary. As Malová and Rybář (2001) point out, no goal advocated by 
particular interests is attained in a linear and smooth manner, especially during 
economic transition with obvious conflicts between long-term and short-term 
priorities of different interest groups. 
 
In the public health sector, such organisations include the Slovak Physicians’ 
Chamber, Slovak Hospitals’ Association, Physicians’ Unions Association, Private 
Physicians’ Association, Association of Medicine Suppliers and Slovak Pharmacists’ 
Association. The forms they employ of advocating their respective interests are 
multiple. They typically include pressure actions such as strikes of different types 
(from those held in front of the Parliament building to closing private physicians’ 
surgeries), drafting decision-making rules in a particular interest area, lobbying in 
support of specific rules all the way to direct participation in the decision-making 
process by appointing members to participate in various committees, the minister’s 
consultative board or transformation board). Communication through media is just 
another tool used by such interest groups. For instance, the Physicians’ Unions 
Association has sent a letter to Romano Prodi, President of the European 
Commission, and Thomas Cox, chairman of the Committee for social affairs, health 
and family, outlining problems facing Slovakia’s health sector.67 They even assume 
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some regulatory responsibilities in the relevant area. As an example, one can point out 
attempts at regulating the free conduct of the medical and pharmacist professions 
based on compulsory membership and membership dues paid by physicians, dentists 
and pharmacists to the Slovak Chamber of Physicians, Slovak Chamber of Dentists 
and Slovak Chamber of Pharmacists respectively. Under the proposal, these chambers 
are to oversee compliance with professional standards by health care service providers 
and to maintain complete membership registers.68  
 
These interest groups are yet to propose a plan for a complex reform in the health care 
sector. Instead, they have been focusing on particular areas and changes directly 
related to the vested interests of respective professions. In the following text we offer 
several such examples.  
 
It is one of the vested interests of private physicians that the flat payments they get for 
their work should increase. This example of group interests advocacy is also 
interesting in that different groups within the health care sector have come to observe 
a clash between their respective vested interests, which has led to a gradual 
divergence of their activities.  
 
Most private physicians are members of the Association of Private Physicians (ASL) 
that brings together formerly precinct physicians (now referred to as general 
practitioners), gynaecologists, paediatricians and dentists. These four groups of 
physicians constitute the primary health care category. They are paid a monthly rate 
for each health care provision contract concluded with a patient that corroborates that 
the patient fall within the physician’s purview. For instance, general practitioners are 
paid SKK 33-38 a month per each such contract. Another ASL group includes 
physicians such as surgeons, otolaryngologists, ophthalmologists and other 
specialists. Health insurance companies monthly order from them a certain volume of 
services assigned specific points and pay specialists only as many points as they have 
commissioned. If a specialist gives care to more patients and renders a greater volume 
of services, he or she will gain more points. On exceeding the ordered threshold, 
however, the specialist will not be paid for the excess. In autumn 2001, the Ministry 
of Health decided to implement a new pricing regulation. Primary care physicians 
were not content with the proposed rate of payments per contract, while specialist 
physicians objected to the fact that the range of point valuation would be dramatically 
reduced. Under the proposal, a single point was to be valued between SKK 0.20 to 
0.50 compared to the then applicable value of SKK 0.30. In practice, this would most 
likely mean the value of the point to be fixed at the level of SKK 0.20. 
 
ASL resorted to several instruments. For example, it withdrew its support for the 
implementation of an out-patient drug prescription form promoted by the Ministry of 
Health aiming to cut drugs consumption. This move was induced by drug 
manufacturers, among others. ASL also tried to start talks with the minister. After a 
breakdown of those talks, the association decided to stage a protest by closing out-
patient surgeries under the formal pretext of attending courses in safety at work and 
civil protection exercises. The association also announced that its members would, in 
protest, be prescribing the most expensive drugs. The participating organisations, 
however, did not see eye to eye with regard to further actions to be taken. The 
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president of the Slovak Physicians’ Union said: “We considered the 19 September 
protest an expression of moral support for ASL. Most Union members, however, 
disagreed with the other forms of follow-up protests.” ASL described them as strike-
breakers.69 Minister Kováč later adjusted the moot point, i.e. the range of the value of 
one point awarded for the provision of health care services originally proposed at 
SKK 0.20-0.50, to SKK 0.34-0.8070.  
 
The Slovak Pharmacists’ Association and the Slovak Chamber of Pharmacists (SLeK) 
have also been fairly active.71 The two organisations spurned a government-sponsored 
bill that would limit claims on bankrupt health insurance companies to collectible 
debt. They demanded that the disputed provisions be deleted from the proposed 
amendment. At its meeting of 16 May 2001, the SLeK board decided to resort to 
direct pressure. On Monday, 21 May 2001, all public pharmacies in Slovakia closed 
their doors, officially as a result of insufficient funds to pay for basic drugs. 
Pharmacists did not specify how long their strike would last. SLeK made the 
reopening of pharmacies conditional on the full settlement of arrears to pharmacies 
and the deletion of the moot provisions from the proposed amendment. According to 
publicly available information, 80-90% of pharmacies were closed during the strike. 
Views, however, differed within SLeK with regard to further action to be taken. The 
representatives of the radical wing were arguing that the protest closures of 
pharmacies had failed because of the avarice of some pharmacists. “It was a narrow 
result, the greed just prevailed among those who thought that the closure would 
deprive their pharmacies of profit.72  
  
With a membership base comprising 23 multinational pharmaceutical companies, the 
Slovak Association of Pharmaceutical Companies (SAFS) chose a different path. 
Since more than SKK 15 billion is reallocated annually to finance drugs policy, the 
relevant process naturally draws the attention of pharmaceutical companies and of this 
association. Ever since its establishment in 1997, SAFS has been aiming to ensure that 
clear rules be implemented in drugs categorisation and drugs policy. For instance, in 
2000 the association proposed an amendment to the Health Care Rules Act.73 A 
private public relations firm is also advocating interests of this group. 
 
Another professional group with vested interests includes teachers or education 
sector employees. Teachers’ interests generally differ depending on the type of 
schools in which they work, e.g. primary, secondary schools and HEIs. Trade unions 
are particularly active among organisations advocating group interests in the primary 
and secondary education. They are primarily involved in promoting better pay, 
smaller workloads, longer holidays and protection against dismissal for teachers and 
non-teaching staff. They seek to achieve their goals by public, mass and pressure 
actions (demonstrations, threats of strike and strikes proper, petitions etc.). On the 
other hand, they take only a marginal interest in the substance of education reforms, 
such as those concerning school curricula. In the higher education domain, there are 
far more representative organisations, the most prominent being the Slovak Rectors’ 
Conference, Council of Higher Educational Institutions or the Student Council of 
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70 Národná obroda, 11.12.2001 
71 Malová and Rybář (2001) 
72 SME, 29. 5. 2001 
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Higher Educational Institutions. Each of them represents interests of a somewhat 
different segment of higher education staff or students. Representatives of this 
particular platform primarily participate in public discussions in connection with the 
legislative framework – the Higher Education Act or the Research and Development 
Act – and budget-related decisions. With regard to tools to exercise their influence, 
universities and their officials give preference to discussions and interests advocacy 
based on bilateral relations. They also use the media and, in extreme situations, public 
pressure activities (such as closure of universities and similar actions). Pressure 
actions, however, are rather exceptional. 
 
A similar pattern can be observed in the attorneys’ profession regulated by the 
Ministry of Justice. By way of an example, one can refer to the activities pursued by 
the Slovak Chamber of Attorneys (SAK). Admission to the Bar is conditional on 
completing three years’ practical experience and passing an attorney qualifications 
examination. As an amendment was drafted to the Attorneys Act, this professional 
interest group attempted to introduce yet another internal regulatory arrangement 
under which an attorney will, before suing another attorney in a matter related to the 
conduct of professional responsibilities, be required to subject such a case to a 
reconciliation procedure before SAK bodies, with details of the reconciliation 
procedure to be stipulated by SAK internal regulations. 
 
Self-regulation mechanisms are also invoked by notaries associated in the Notaries’ 
Chamber of the Slovak Republic based in Bratislava. The Chamber receives revenues 
in the form of membership dues, gifts and other income. Membership dues are 
compulsory for all notaries. The number of notaries and the locations of work are 
explicitly regulated and generally coincide with the seats of first instance courts, i.e. 
district courts. A notary is appointed by the Minister of Justice based on the outcome 
of a formal selection process. The process of selecting a notary to fill a vacancy is not 
governed by law but rather by an internal regulation of the Notaries’ Chamber. Under 
that regulation, a public competition is announced by the Chamber Board, which 
appoints 3 representatives to the selection committee and the minister may, but is not 
required to, appoint another 2 members of the committee. A simple majority vote is 
taken to rank candidates. A list of candidates is then referred to the minister. In the 
past, it happened that a public competition had been announced to fill a vacancy in 
Bratislava and a notary with a track record elsewhere had not “passed” through the 
selection procedure organised by the Notaries’ Chambers. As a result, the position in 
Bratislava remained vacant although notaries from other locations would have liked to 
fill it. The Notaries’ Chamber charges fees for qualifications examinations 
 
Judges are associated in several professional organisations. The Slovak Judges’ 
Association based in Banská Bystrica is the oldest one. Female judges have their own 
Association of Female Judges of Slovakia.  
 
Officials of the Slovak Judges’ Association have been preparing a discussion on the 
need for judicial reform and its substance. They have been working on proposals for 
systemic measures and submitting them to the Minister of Justice. However, views on 
the substance of the reform often differ. As the president of the district court in 
Banská Bystrica J. Dubovcová said, “the Slovak Judges’ Association was established 
here (in Banská Bystrica) ten years ago. A group was working here around Ľudovít 
Bradáč and Ján Hrubala, who were the first to raise the topic of independence of the 
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judiciary. The other regions will either join in or remain silent. For example, as 
demands for higher pay were formulated, the whole of Slovakia was united; however, 
when we address issues of self-governance and greater accountability, a big hush 
prevails over Slovakia.”74 Diverging attitudes to the Association’s agenda have, 
among other things, resulted in the situation that P. Rohárik, the Association’s 
president, who had begun to alert fellow members to the problem of corruption within 
the profession, was not elected to this position again.  
  
Local governments are mainly represented by the Association of Towns and 
Communities of Slovakia (ZMOS). As of 30 June 2000, Slovakia had 2,742 
communities and 136 towns (with Bratislava and Košice divided into boroughs). At 
the time, ZMOS members included 2,760 out of 2,917 local governments, 
communities and towns as well as Bratislava and Košice boroughs.  
 
ZMOS has used, and continues to use, several avenues of communication with central 
authorities. On the one hand, ZMOS has been active in organising conferences and 
seminars attended, among others, by government officials and MPs. Advocacy of the 
public administration reform has become a core agenda for ZMOS. On the other hand, 
it should be noted that, given the nature of ZMOS membership, existing political 
connections do influence the forms of advocacy the organisation uses. As it happens, 
ZMOS is largely comprised of political parties’ regional officials. Therefore, ZMOS 
officials actually represent respective political parties at the decentralised level. Many 
politicians active nation-wide (e.g. president Rudolf Schuster, parliament deputy 
chairman Ivan Presperín and many MPs) are, or used to be, active at the local level as 
local councillors or mayors. As a result, pressure for the public administration reform 
was also exerted by the regional structures of political parties. The public 
administration reform has also been advocated by opinion-shaping media. ZMOS has 
held numerous press conferences and actively communicated with media. The public 
administration reform has been supported by non-governmental organisations and 
ZMOS has closely co-operated with the government’s commissioner for public 
administration reform.  
 
However, ZMOS has chosen to keep clear of many topics related to the public 
administration reform or to address them without any substantial communication with 
the media. The position of ZMOS and its links with political parties were visible 
during attempts to amend the Constitution in February 2001 as ZMOS objected to 
proposals to expand the authority of the Supreme Audit Office so as to enable 
oversight over local governments. The situation repeated itself in November-
December 2001 as the SAO Act was amended. The President yielded to ZMOS pleas 
and returned the proposed amendment to Parliament, which subsequently ruled 
against expanding SAO authority to this area.  
 
III.8. Case Study: Enacting the Civil Service Act75 
 
The process leading to the enactment of the Civil Service Act in the period of 1999 - 
2001 is an interesting case study inasmuch as it illustrates the interests and approaches 
of many key players: foreign counterparts (more specifically, the European 
                                                 
74 Domino Fórum, 11.10.2001 
75 The chapter is primarily based on data presented by Beblavý (2000) and Beblavý (2001) and on 
sources quoted next to specific statements. 
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Commission), trade unions, media and civil servants participating in public policy- 
making. Because of the significance of this new norm and the internal conflict within 
the ruling coalition, we have for almost two years been witnesses of a very open and 
enlightening game. 
 
The Civil Service Act should govern the terms and conditions of employment of 
approximately 36,000 civil servants at the “core” of the state machinery, i.e. most 
employees working at ministries and other central state authorities, at the local 
authorities of state administration and tax authorities. Career military servicemen, 
customs officials and police officers are subject to their own laws. Other public sector 
employees are subject to the Public Service Act. 
 
The enactment of the Civil Service Act has been the ambition of all governments 
since the early 1990s.76 The law was finally enacted in July 2001 following two years 
of discussions within the ruling coalition of Mikuláš Dzurinda, with active 
participation of trade unions and NGO experts.  
 
This law was intended to provide for legislative conditions for establishing a core 
group of non-partisan professional civil servants within the state machinery, using 
systems applied by most west European countries as a model. As it turned out, 
however, the parties involved did not see eye to eye with regard to approaches to be 
used in achieving this goal. 
 
The following description should suffice for the purpose of this case study: 
1. Together with trade unions operating in the public administration sector, a group 
around the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family as the bill sponsor 
emphasised the need for social and other safeguards for civil servants and their 
protection against a subjective approach (additional salaries, bonuses and other 
financial incentives, a virtually fail-safe lifelong tenure of office, rigid 
remuneration and promotion schemes). 
2. Together with some non-government experts (including one of the authors of this 
publication), a group around Ivan Mikloš, deputy prime minister responsible for 
the economy, underlined flexibility, differentiation and ethical systems (greater 
emphasis on base pay with performance-linked special benefits, performance 
review, greater emphasis on avoiding conflicts of interest and ethics, greater pay 
differentiation and flexibility, especially in respect of junior staff). 
 
An official version of the bill was drafted in 1999 drawing on previous working 
versions. After discussions with the government’s consultative bodies, in April 2000 
the bill was ready to be reviewed by the Cabinet. However, given the political conflict 
between Ivan Mikloš and the Minister of Labour, Social Affairs and Family, Peter 
Magvaši, the Cabinet decided to defer formal deliberations until July when it again 
postponed the deadline to enable broader preliminary discussions of the bill. The 
discussions dragged on until January 2001. During that period, several adjustments 
were applied to the bill, though largely minor by nature. Following talks between the 
prime minister, Mikuláš Dzurinda, the deputy prime minister responsible for 
European integration, Pavol Hamžík, Ivan Mikloš and Peter Magvaši, it became clear 
that no agreement was possible and a decision was taken in January 2001 to discuss 
                                                 
76 See the Explanatory Report to the Civil Service Act 
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the bill at a special Cabinet meeting on 4 March 2001. Together with external experts, 
Ivan Mikloš formulated amendments to the bill which the Cabinet discussed and 
accepted several of them. On 5 March 2001 the bill was submitted to parliament. 
Parliament approved the bill on 2 July 2001, having incorporated amendments 
proposed by several MPs (in particular Peter Tatár) for which Ivan Mikloš had failed 
to win the support of Cabinet. Trade union protests notwithstanding, the President 
signed the bill into law, part of which entered into force on 1 October 2001 (the 
remaining provisions of the law will become effective on 1 April 2002).77 
 
Legislating for the law has actively involved virtually all groups analysed in this 
study, for which reason we make use of this process as a case study. In the following 
text we will take a closer look at their interests, instruments and approaches. 
 
Among trade unions, the dominating position was that of the public administration 
union SLOVES. Both officially and informally, the Trade Unions Confederation has 
invariably and resolutely advocated the interests of public sector employees as 
presented by SLOVES. It was noted earlier that their approach emphasised social and 
other safeguards for civil servants as the main tool of improving the quality of civil 
servants and enhancing civil service performance. In the Czech Republic, by contrast, 
trade unions as a whole did not support steps perceived as granting unjustified 
benefits to a certain segment of employees. 
 
Therefore, both KOZ and SLOVES resorted to all available instruments (such as an 
official place at the negotiating table under the Economic and Social Partnership Act, 
close political and opinion associations with the bill sponsor, i.e. the Ministry of 
Labour, Social Affairs and Family, and with the Party of Democratic Left, press 
conferences, articles, interviews, the ownership of the Práca daily and other media 
policy instruments, the membership of the SLOVES president and KOZ vice-
president, Igor Lenský, in the Government’s Legislative Board) to ensure that their 
approach to the bill prevails. Given a considerable closeness of views and political 
stances between the trade unions and the bill sponsor, their opinions were in large 
measure incorporated into the official version proposed and advocated by the Ministry 
of Labour, Social Affairs and Family. 
 
When, following discussions within the Cabinet and, in particular, in Parliament, the 
bill was significantly revised in areas that KOZ and SLOVES regarded as crucial, 
they no longer considered the law meaningful and demanded that it be rescinded and 
that the scope of the Public Service Act be expanded to include civil servants as well. 
Compared to the Public Service Act, the civil service counterpart had a number of 
provisions envisaging tighter recruitment and performance review requirements, 
anticorruption measures and protection against politically motivated dismissal. On the 
other hand, it no longer provided for end-of-career severance pay, additional pension 
and some other benefits.78 
 
The European Union represented by the European Commission, SIGMA and the 
Delegation of the European Commission in Bratislava had, and still have, a vested 
interest in seeing in the country a qualified high-quality administrative apparatus 
                                                 
77 see SITA, 2.7.2001, 4.7.2001, Profit, 6.7.2001, Pravda, 13.7.2001, TREND, 15.8.2001 
78 see PRAVDA, 24.7.2001, TREND, 15.8.2001 
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capable of implementing enacted legislation and other obligations and of 
administering financial flows from the EU to Slovakia.79 Furthermore, under the 
Vladimír Mečiar government, it had been generally held that the civil service was 
subjected to massive politically motivated reshuffles, which not only weakened its 
capacity but also jeopardised democracy. Therefore, the European Commission 
regarded the enactment of the Civil Service Act as a priority, one that after 1998 
became an official short-term priority under Slovakia’s accession process. Obligations 
of that status can be numbered on the fingers of one hand in a given year, which only 
served to highlight the significance of enacting civil service legislation for the 
accession process and, by the same token, for Slovak politics. 
 
Therefore, the EU stance became the main driving force behind attempts to enact civil 
service legislation despite conflicts within the ruling coalition and other segments of 
society. The relevant bill should have been passed in the summer of 2000 as part of 
the labour law reform so that the enactment could be positively reflected in the regular 
report published by the EC in November and evaluating Slovakia’s progress towards 
accession. Because of political bickering within the Cabinet, this target was not met 
and enactment in 2001 became an absolute deadline to ensure that the 
accomplishment would be fulfilled by the deadline for the EC November 2001 report. 
In view of the summer recess, the bill would have to be approved at the June session 
of Parliament at the latest, which implied that it would have to be submitted to 
Parliament by 5 March 2001. This fact was the crucial factor that, following a year of 
discussions, forced the Cabinet to meet at a special session on 4 March 2001 and 
strike a deal. 
 
The European Commission used two instruments to achieve its goals. The main 
instrument took the form of opinions, information and attitudes submitted bilaterally 
and in confidence, both in writing and orally, by experts and politicians throughout 
the entire drafting and approval process. Their purpose was to get across to Slovakia’s 
top government officials and their subordinates the importance of enacting civil 
service legislation, to present specific requirements in terms of its substance and to 
comment on specific aspects of the proposed bill. The other instrument included 
public statements of the European Commission and its experts in the form of the 
regular reports on the progress of Slovakia towards EU accession, other published 
analyses and interviews with Slovak media. 
 
In very simple terms, public statements could be described as instruments of 
generating overall political will in Slovakia and of eliciting “crude” adjustments of 
steps taken by the Slovak government. This view is supported by the fact that 
European integration is a political priority that enjoys wide public support in Slovakia. 
Therefore, political statements on the topic can be used as an instrument of generating 
political will. If the EU announces that failure to enact civil service legislation would 
be a major obstacle to Slovakia’s accession to the EU, this would exert considerable 
pressure to bear on the Slovak government and parliament for passing the required 
law. The instrument is “crude” inasmuch as the transmission mechanism – public 
statements by the EU – media response in Slovakia – political pressure on the 
government and parliament – adoption of relevant steps – is fairly indirect and can 
successfully transmit but only very simple, almost binary, signals (e.g. something is 
                                                 
79 See EC (2000) and EC (2001) 
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necessary or, by contrast, unsafe). On the other hand, it cannot send signals about 
specific portions of a law or it can do so in most general terms only. In this regard, 
bilateral documents presented in confidence constitute a far subtler instrument that, 
although lacking the political drive of the previous one, can fall back on public 
statements and much more accurately communicate specific stances and requirements. 
 
The involvement of the European Commission, however, had many ironical 
implications for the entire process. In terms of substance, the EC was relying on 
experts from SIGMA, a joint organisation of the OECD and EC for public 
administration reform in transition economies. From the very beginning SIGMA 
experts noted several problems in the “ministerial” draft bill and their criticisms in 
many respects overlapped with those of Slovak specialists that deputy prime minister 
Ivan Mikloš had accepted as valid. Therefore, the concrete version of the bill that the 
EC supported was significantly different from the Ministry of Labour-sponsored draft 
bill.80 As a result, each party to Slovakia’s internal dispute chose from the EC position 
those aspects that it felt would strengthen its position in the conflict. The Ministry of 
Labour, Social Affairs and Family and other advocates of the ministerial bill would 
emphasise the need for enacting the law to attain the accession goals and would 
downplay EC criticisms. By contrast, deputy prime minister Ivan Mikloš as well as 
experts and politicians working with him would focus on criticisms and seek to 
overlook the implications of non-enactment for accession. Paradoxically, EC 
pressures being very strong, this stance, together with reluctance to officially interfere 
with Slovakia’s internal affairs, was ultimately instrumental in promoting the 
Ministry-sponsored bill even though the EC position was closer to the alternative 
proposal. 
 
Following the initial lack of interest, most media primarily portrayed the issue as a 
dispute between deputy prime minister Mikloš and minister Magvaši, especially with 
regard to incentives and privileges for civil servants. The media projected the dispute 
in the framework of the EU requirement that the law be enacted. Non-political actors 
(SLOVES officials, non-governmental experts etc. operators) were playing a 
secondary role in the media. Overall, the media moderately favoured the “reformist” 
approach of Mikloš, even though it was natural that in such a complicated issue they 
were seeking to remain more neutral than with regard to other political conflicts 
within the Dzurinda coalition (e.g. concerning decentralisation).81 
 
With regard to civil servants directly involved in policy-making, the bill represented 
one of the few instances where a system under preparation would have a direct and 
significant impact on their individual and groups interests. Civil servants directly 
participating in drafting the bill and a large proportion of other civil servants viewed 
the would-be law as a tool in the following two areas:82 
1. As a tool for protection against political purges and for a general rise in job 
security and protection against dismissal or other interference in their work by 
politicians and superiors. 
2. As a tool of making the civil service more attractive by means of amassing new 
and existing incentives. Since attempts at significantly increasing the pay scale in 
                                                 
80 This statement is based on a confidential opinion of SIGMA and the EC available to the author; also, 
see PRAVDA, 4.10.2000 and 13.10.2000 
81 e.g. see Pravda, 6.3.2001, HN, 5.3.2001, SME, 5.3.2001, NO, 8.3.2001 
82 See the Explanatory Report to the Civil Service Act 
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the civil service had failed, an alternative tool was to incorporate hidden 
incentives that would become manifest later on. This approach had its political 
logic. Given a short-term political outlook and the fact that public opinion was not 
too inclined to civil servants, it was simpler to advocate gradually accruing 
benefits, especially those associated with future costs and those relatively hidden 
from the public. This approach was also associated with similar incentives offered 
to armed forces personnel and police officers as there is an understandable and 
simple psychological need for creating an “even ground”. 
 
Civil servants, therefore, were mostly able to shape the bill during the drafting stage 
and while it was deliberated by the executive branch of the government. After the bill 
was submitted to Parliament, they no longer organised any public events or other 
demonstrable pressure action. This fact only confirmed their preference for “behind 
the scenes” tactics. 
 
The third sector as a whole, i.e. non-governmental organisations of different types and 
focus, did not have a position of its own concerning the civil service bill. Participants 
in the discussion were but a few NGOs of the think-tank type, in particular INEKO – 
Institute for Economic and Social Reform – and Transparency International Slovakia, 
for which the substance of the bill was highly relevant for the areas of their operation 
such as the efficiency and quality of public administration, transparency and 
corruption. These NGOs would advocate the values they had been established to 
promote by using corresponding methods such as opinions and proposals and by 
promoting them publicly. In this particular case, they represented the other side of the 
coin. Having political will to advance change and reform in which they believed, 
some politicians lacked expertise to draft and finalise them.83 
 
                                                 
83 See SME, 6.3.2001 and 11.6.2001, Pravda, 4.7.2001 
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CHAPTER IV: SELECTED ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
PUBLIC POLICY-MAKING84 
 
A large part of this study has so far dealt with the policy-making process from a 
positive standpoint by looking at how the process evolves, what forces influence it 
and what outcomes it generates. This chapter is a normative one; it explores certain 
issues associated with the process and suggests possible solutions for improvement. 
 
To identify the issues and propose solutions, it is essential to answer, either implicitly 
or explicitly, the following questions: What should a public policy-making process be 
like? What criteria should it meet? 
 
A functioning public policy-making process should ensure that all relevant interests 
are represented in the decision-making process and, by the same token, that the 
process remains open. The process should take into consideration the needs of diverse 
groups and should be transparent so that the public can gain access to information and 
can monitor the process (see UNDP (2001), p. 16). It should also be effective and 
operational in terms of generating decisions fast and without excessive costs for 
participants. It should also identify clear political accountability for the final decision 
in a particular matter. 
 
Another – key – feature of a sound public policy-making process is to what extent it 
takes into account and incorporates the principle of the inevitability of choice. In 
formulating specific sectoral policies and in ensuring their co-ordination and 
financing, it is never possible to meet all targets and satisfy all aspirations; not even if 
there is no direct conflict between them since financial, human, natural and other 
resources are finite. Therefore, a major part of public policy-making is not so much 
about generating and advocating ideas but about choosing between different 
proposals, all of them acceptable as a matter of principle. As this choice is the basis of 
sound public policy-making, a sound process puts it to the forefront of attention. 
 
IV.1. Reform and accession overload and associated issues 
 
A major factor determining public policy-making in Slovakia, especially in 1999-
2002, has been the so-called reform and accession overload. Given the reform 
commitments of the Government formulated in its 1998 manifesto and associated with 
the need to expedite the EU accession process (in comparison with the countries that 
had commenced accession negotiations two years earlier and with which Slovakia 
wanted to catch up), politicians and their administrative apparatus were exposed to a 
considerable overload of the existing capacity. This does not imply that the existing 
capacity was inadequate in quantitative terms but rather that, in terms of quality, it 
was overwhelmed by the need to cope with all responsibilities ensuing from the 
reform and accession processes and, moreover, to cope with them in accordance with 
exigent standards. 
 
One of the major problems of public policy-making and legislative instruments is a 
lack of human resources with appropriate skills and aptitudes. In part, this situation is 
                                                 
84 In many areas this section draws heavily on the study by Miroslav Beblavý, Tony Verheijen and 
Katarína Staroňová “Rozvoj kultúry tvorby verejnej politiky na Slovensku” [Developing the Culture of 
Public Policy Making in Slovakia] written for NOS – OSF in April-October 2001.  
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a reflection of an overall lack of this capacity in post-communist countries; it is 
essential, however, to take into account other factors as well. According to Beblavý, 
Verheijen and Staroňová (2001), ministries primarily employ young (under 30 years 
of age) or elderly (50 year-old plus) staff. Managers are complaining that there is a 
gap not filled by middle-aged officials with adequate expertise, conceptual abilities 
and creativity. Because of a rigid remuneration system, the ministries are generally 
facing the problem of recruiting, retaining and motivating skilled staff able to do 
conceptual work. 
 
With regard to EU accession and the impact of that goal on public policy-making, 
there is the risk that areas of public policy-making in Slovakia are falling behind in 
attempts to fulfil EU priorities. In part, this is due to lack of domestic public policy-
making capacity and, in part, lack of a clear conceptual strategy within the 
Government Office. 
 
The reform and accession overload will gradually diminish; however, the risk of 
inadequate advocacy of own priorities and interests will remain and become even 
more acute after EU accession. This issue, therefore, deserves special attention and 
one can only recommend that experts look closely at the experience of Poland, 
Lithuania and Latvia that, despite similar capacity and financial restrictions, have 
been able to deal with the issue more effectively than Slovakia. 
 
In general, one can talk about long-term steps to expand and enhance the human 
resources capacity with regard to public policy. The main steps include impeccable 
implementation of a new regulatory framework created by the Civil Service Act, 
especially in the next three areas: 
• recruiting new high-quality human resources 
• investment in existing human resources (education, networking and informal 
contacts, …) 
• using incentives to improve performance of existing human resources 
 
A more detailed analysis of this general question would, however, be beyond the 
scope and ambition of the present study. 
 
IV.2. Civil society participation in public policy-making 
 
As pointed out previously, the participation and openness of the entire process 
constitute a key issue in ensuring the representation of relevant public interests in the 
decision-making process and in determining the extent to which the public can gain 
access to information and can monitor the underlying process. 
 
One can observe that in Slovakia external organisations and individuals are involved 
in public policy-making in a much more intensive fashion than is generally the case in 
many other central and eastern European countries. It should also be pointed out, 
however, that there are considerable differences in that respect between different 
ministries and the choice concerning who from the external environment can 
participate in the process is neither regulated nor predictable nor transparent. 
 
According to Beblavý, Verheijen, Staroňová (2001), the reasons for intensive 
participation of external organisations vary and include: 
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• the need to ensure wide support for drafted policy proposals by the groups 
involved 
• lacking internal capacity at the ministries for the preparation for high-quality 
policy papers 
• low confidence that politicians and top ministerial officials frequently have in the 
aptitudes of ministerial staff 
 
In addition to its benefits, this approach is also associated with the risk that external 
participation may often supplant the internal capacity of the ministries in matters of 
substance. Potentially, this could result in the ministries being taken over by external 
interest groups, especially in areas with a limited number of actors participating in the 
process. It should be emphasised, however, that in most instances intensive 
consultations are a result of the prevailing trend within the government and state 
administration to seek a broad political discussion concerning important public policy 
concepts. 
 
Therefore, one can recommend strengthening the participation of officials at central 
government authorities in formulating public policy concepts, a responsibility that is 
currently to a large extent borne by working groups largely comprised of external 
experts. A change would, however, call for the cutting of a vicious circle where a 
shortage of public policy-making capacity at the ministries strengthens the lack of 
confidence in ministerial officials on the part of top civil servants, which puts them 
off investment while building up that capacity, especially if such investment is only 
likely to bear fruit in the medium to long-term. This means that the beginning of an 
electoral term presents the best opportunity for change as politicians can then 
realistically hope to see the outcomes of such investment. 
 
IV.3. Corruption in public policy-making 
 
As described in detail in Chapter III, public policy-making is associated with frequent 
interactions between the public sector and general public. Sičáková (2000) points out 
that influences exerted by interest groups on elected officials and public 
administration are a natural and inseparable part of democracy. It enables the 
interchange of individual pieces of experience, views, interests and opinions of 
interest groups represented in the political spectrum and, in this regard, the process is 
informative and useful. Proper lobbying provides the public administration with 
useful and relevant information alerting to existing or contingent issues. Lobbying 
could be described as a direct action of an individual, interest group or its 
representative on an elected or government official, which aims to influence the 
outcome of a legislative or regulatory process and does not represent a conflict of 
interests or corruption. An essential feature of lobbying is that it is a public activity or 
an activity that lends itself to public control. As long as lobbying is conducted 
publicly and as long as all interest groups are granted more or less equal access to 
elected officials and the public administration, lobbying contributes to information 
interchange on the legislative and political market and helps to enhance the quality of 
the legislative process. 
Too frequently, however, the meaning of lobbying is interchanged with that of 
corruption. Drawing a clear line between these two phenomena is no easy job in 
Slovakia either. Compared to the above definition of lobbying, we believe that 
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corruption consists in a direct action by an individual, interest group or its 
representative on an elected or government official aiming to influence the outcomes 
of a legislative, regulatory or executive process in return for a financial or other 
consideration that benefits the elected or government official or the political party that 
they represent. As a rule, corruption is not public. 
Lack of transparency in the public sector is one of the main features suggesting the 
existence of corruption85, including political corruption. In simplified terms, the extent 
of corruption, including political corruption, is a function of the qualitative and 
quantitative parameters of the public administration that could be described as the 
extent of potential benefit (quantity) and extent of potential risk (quality). This is 
where possible solutions should be sought. For the purpose of this study, the 
quantitative parameters imply the scope of public administration involvement, i.e. the 
extent of regulation and reallocation processes.86 The qualitative parameters that 
should become the focus of prevention include, for example87 
• a clear separation of politics and the economy, e.g. by determining which 
positions in the public sector are to be filled by political nominees and which ones 
are reserved for experts88 and by consistently abiding by this principle. 
• enhancing the transparency of processes carried out by the public sector, e.g. in 
public procurements 
• addressing discretionary decision-making and the potential conflict of interests to 
which decision-makers are exposed in granting licenses, grants or subsidies 
• implementing clear and controllable party-finance rules 
• respecting and implementing principles such as equal opportunities or 
accountability. 
 
A reform of the repression chain, i.e. supervision, the police, prosecutor’s office and 
courts, would increase the risk resulting from corruption behaviour and provide for 
better enforceability of law. 
 
At the same time, it is necessary to consider the introduction of clear rules to regulate 
the interaction of the public sector with public officials, e.g. in the form of a lobbying 
law.90 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
85 In a 1999 survey by CPHR [Centre for Economic Development], up to 84% of respondents 
encountered instances of corruption in public administration. 85% respondents thought that, compared 
to the OECD, corruption in Slovakia was more serious. On the other hand, up to 94% of entrepreneurs 
thought that, in the long run, a fair and uncorrupted environment was more conducive to doing business 
than an informal economy. Corruption in Slovakia is rampant. It is virtually impossible to determine 
when public office is abused to gain a direct personal benefit or to benefit a third party, e.g. a political 
party. For details, see Sičáková (2000).  
86 In that context, Slovakia can be described as an economy with a significant degree of intervention by 
public administration into economic processes. 
87 For details, see the National Program for Fighting Corruption at www.transparency.sk.  
88 For details, see the section on civil and public service laws.  
89 For details, see Zemanovičová, Sičáková and Ondrejka (2001). 
90 For possible approaches to the problem, see Sičáková (2000).  
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IV.4. Financial realism in public policy 
 
Let us first consider the following two quotations: 
 
“If we neglect the public policy- and decision-making process, we will deserve, and 
ultimately experience, poor public policies and decisions… The key in this regard is 
the method by which money is gained that the government spends to fulfil the tasks 
assigned to the state” (Schiavo-Campo and Tommasi (1999), p. xvii) 
 
“A public budget should be an economic mirror of social and economic decisions by 
society” (Schiavo-Campo and Sundaram (2001), p. 221). 
 
Even though public policy-making cannot be reduced to public funds reallocation and 
budgeting, and allocated funds are the key to implementing any decisions in public 
policy. It is the budgeting process and budget implementation that highlight the 
necessity of choice given the finite nature of public funds. 
 
At present Slovakia does not make that choice until the annual drafting of the state 
budget begins. Moreover, the choice is made in a way that neither permits politicians, 
media and the general public to analyse public finance priorities nor otherwise 
subjects public finances to genuine analysis. In this regard, two topics deserve 
particular attention: medium-term budgeting and activity-based budgeting. 
 
Medium-term budgeting integrates the present and future budget situation (anticipated 
total revenues and expenditures) with projected future spending on key government 
programs. Without medium-term budgeting, the ever-present conflict between the 
claims of sectoral policies on budget funds and funds availability is only addressed 
during the drafting of the annual budget for the next year only. Thus, a conflict 
arises between medium-term finance requirements ensuing from approved medium- 
and long-term policy documents and the funds that will actually be allocated in 
several years’ time when drafting the annual budget. 
 
In other words, there is no pressure to harmonise medium- and long-term projections 
of budget requirements for specific policies with the overall medium-term budget 
outlook, i.e. with what will be feasible under the budget in the medium term. This 
frequently leads to projections in policy documents being unrealistic as they are 
primarily intended to “clamour” for future funding. This system results in making 
medium-term policy planning overly complicated and, in some instances, 
meaningless. 
 
Activity-based budgeting consists in linking appropriations to specific activities that 
they are meant to finance. It is a key instrument for creating a direct relationship 
between political decisions concerning public policy priorities and their actual 
implementation as well as for exercising public control over what public funds are 
spent on. 
 
Even though the Ministry of Finance does prepare an official medium-term budget 
outlook and the implementation of activity-based budgeting, the results so far are not 
too impressive. The reasons include the fact that the process is not considered a high 
priority; the philosophy of the underlying processes and of other elements of the 
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budget process reform is not thought over sufficiently well. The entire process is only 
marginally connected with public administration reform and public policy-making 
reform. 
 
Therefore, one can recommend that greater emphasis be placed on the relationship 
between the public policy-making reform and budgeting reform and on expediting 
reforms in both areas as one integrated entity. 
 
IV.5. Lack of a clearly defined vision and inadequate co-ordination 
 
In this section we take a close look at co-ordination within ministries and between 
different ministries within the government. 
 
The internal situation within the ministries is characterised by a highly fragmented 
approach to public policy-making. There are very few arrangements in place to ensure 
an integrated approach to the entire ministry (or ministries), although such an 
approach is necessary and can be rationalised. At present, most ministry departments 
are considered autonomous units and relations between the departments within a 
ministry have the nature of relations with other ministries. Mechanisms for dispute 
resolution between departments are mostly functional (although this to a large extent 
depends on a particular minister, which is not a desirable solution from a structural 
point of view). Disregarding the dispute resolution mechanism, however, there 
appears to be little more than just a minimal structure that keeps the interests of 
different departments together. Even when the minister has an overall vision for the 
entrusted ministry, this is not per se sufficient to formulate a long-term 
approach/strategy. 
 
The key issue is almost total dependence on heads of departments as principal public 
policy-makers accountable to the minister (and, in some measure, to the outside 
world) for the preparation of policy proposals in their respective areas. Unless change 
is introduced, the departments will carry on without incentives and pressure to make 
them communicate with each other or cooperate with the policy-making departments, 
because the main pressure and incentive is to come up with “their own” policy 
proposals. 
 
In Chapter II we analysed in detail some issues relating to the lack of strategic 
thinking in public policy-making and the lack of co-ordination between ministries and 
within the government. In particular, this concerned an inadequate ex ante contract 
between political parities of the ruling coalition, i.e. the fact that the government 
manifesto was not sufficiently concrete. Similarly, we referred to a lack of closer links 
between politicians in the executive branch of the government, ministerial apparatus 
and MPs representing the ruling coalition. 
 
Some remedial action has already been taken, but it would be premature to evaluate 
results at present. Based on the recommendations of the audit of central authorities, in 
the first six months of 2001 the Cabinet approved two documents with a major impact 
on the public policy-making process. The first of them dealt with the government’s 
consultative bodies. The other major change approved by the Cabinet addressed the 
inter-ministerial process of comments. Those have been but the very first steps that 
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represent the possible beginning of change necessary to better co-ordinate public 
policy-making within and between ministries. 
 
In this regard, it can be recommended that the ruling coalition parties and their leaders 
pay more attention to 
• formulating the government manifesto 
• the process of transition between different governments 
• the impact of coalitions upon public policies. 
 
  77 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Ch. Andrain (1994): Comparative Political Systems: Policy Performance and Social 
Change, Sharpe, Armonk 
 
M. Beblavý (2000): Civil service reform and transformation of the role of state, paper 
written for the UNDP conference on “Public Administration and Civil Service Reform 
– Experience of Transition”, Almaty, November 17 – 18 
 
M. Beblavý (2001): Zákon o štátnej službe a jeho schvaľovanie na Slovensku, 
Integrace – Journal of European Integration, 8/2001, Prague 
 
M. Beblavý, T. Verheijen a K. Staroňová (2001): Rozvoj kultúry tvorby verejnej 
politiky na Slovensku, NOS-OSF, Bratislava 
 
D. Baird, R. Gertner a R. Picker (1998): Game Theory and the Law, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge 
 
R. Coase (1960): The Problem of Social Cost, Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 3, 
no. 1 
 
J. Coleman (1990): Foundations of Social Theory, Bellenap Press, Cambridge. 
 
R. Cooter a T. Ulen (1997): Law and Economics, Addison-Wesley, Reading 
 
M. Crepaz (1995): Institutional Dinosaur: Austrian Corporatism in the Post-Industrial 
Age. West European Politics, v. 18, no. 4 
 
P. Demeš (2000): Občianska advokácia alebo ako dosiahnuť spoločenskú zmenu, in: 
Čítanka pre pokročilé neziskové organizácie, Partners for Democratic Change, SAIA 
– Servisné centrum pre tretí sektor, Bratislava 
 
P. Demeš (2001): Tretí sektor a dobrovoľníctvo, in: Kollár, M. a G. Mesežnikov 
(eds.): Súhrnná správa o stave spoločnosti, Inštitút pre verejné otázky, Bratislava 
 
P. Egardt (1998): Sweden: Policy- and Decision-Making in a Coalition System, in 
Management Challenges at the Centre of the Government: Coalition Situations and 
Government Transitions, Sigma Paper No. 22, OECD, Paris 
 
EK (2000): Regular Report on Progress Made by Slovakia in Preparation for 
Accession in 2000, European Commission, Brussels 
 
EK (2001): Regular Report on Progress Made by Slovakia in Preparation for 
Accession in 2001, European Commission, Brussels 
 
F. Fukuyama (1995): Trust, Free Press Paperbacks 
 
J. Hellmann (1998): Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reforms in 
Postcommunist Transitions, World Politics 
  78 
 
J. Hellman, G. Jones, D. Kaufmann (2000): Seize the State, Seize the Day, The World 
Bank, Washington, D.C. 
 
M. Horn (1995): The Political Economy of Public Administration: Institutional 
Choice in the Public Sector, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
 
W. Jacoby (2001): Tutors and Pupils: International Organizations, Central European 
Elites and Western Models, Governance: An International Journal of Policy and 
Administration, vol. 14, no. 2 
 
P. Katzenstein (1984): Corporatism and Change: Austria, Switzerland and the Politics 
of Industry, Cornell University Press, Ithaca 
 
L. Kolarska-Bobinska (2000): The Second Wave of Polish Reforms, Institute of 
Public Affairs, Warszawa 
 
I. Krastev (2001): Think Tanks - Making and Faking Influence, In: Accountabillity 
and Legitimacy, European Foundation Center 
 
D. Malová a M. Rybář (2001): Organizované záujmy, in: Kollár, M. a G. Mesežnikov 
(eds.): Súhrnná správa o stave spoločnosti, Inštitút pre verejné otázky, Bratislava 
 
U. Mattei (1998): Comparative Law and Economics, The University of Michigan 
Press, Ann Arbor 
 
P. Milgrom a J. Roberts (1992): Economics, Organization and Management, Prentice 
Hall International, Englewood Cliffs 
 
R. Miller, D. Benjamin a D. North (2000): The Economics of Public Policy Issues, 
Addison-Wesley, Reading 
 
Z. Mistríková a M. Žitný (2001): Úloha médií v boji proti korupcii, etika v médiách, 
korupcia v médiách, CPHR - Transparency International Slovensko, Bratislava 
 
D. North (1990): Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
 
OECD (1997): Law drafting and regulatory management in Central and Eastern 
Europe, Sigma papers No. 18, OECD, Paris 
 
R. Putnam (1993): Making Democracy Work, Princeton University Press, Princeton 
 
A. Puviani (1973): Teoria dell´Illusione Finanziaria, ISEDI, Milan 
 
S. Schiavo-Campo a D. Tommasi (1999): Managing Government Expenditure, Asian 
Development Bank, Manila 
 
S. Schiavo-Campo a P.S.A. Sundaram (2001): To serve and to preserve: improving 
public administration in a competitive world, Asian Development Bank, Manila 
  79 
 
E. Sičáková a D. Zemanovičová (2000): Konflikt záujmov, etika a etický kódex vo 
verejnej správe, CPHR – Transparency International Slovensko, Bratislava 
 
E. Sičáková (2000): Presadzovanie záujmov vo formujúcej sa demokracii, CPHR – 
Transparency International Slovensko, Bratislava 
 
J. Stiglitz (1997): Ekonomie verějného sektoru, Grada Publishing, Prague 
 
Y. Strecková, I. Malý a kol. (1998): Veřejná ekonomie pro školu i praxi, Edice 
Ekonomie, Prague 
 
Svetová banka (2000): Korupcia na Slovensku – Výsledky diagnostických 
prieskumov Svetovej banky, www.government.gov.sk 
 
J. Tóth (2000): Fiskálna politika, in: Marcinčin, A. a M. Beblavý (eds.): Hospodárska 
politika na Slovensku 1990 – 1999, CSMA, SFPA, INEKO, Bratislava 
 
UNDP (2001): Latvia - Human Development Report: The Public Policy Process in 
Latvia, UNDP, Riga 
 
V. Tanzi (2000): Policies, Institutions and Dark Side of Economics, Edward Elgar 
Publishing, Inc., Cheltenham 
 
H. Wiarda (1997): Corporatism and Comparative Politics, The Other Great “Ism”, 
Sharpe, Armon 
 
H. Zeigler (1992): Interest groups, in: Hawkesworth A. a Kogan M. (eds.): 
Encyclopedia of Government and Politics, Volume I., Routledge 
 
D. Zemanovičová, a kol. (1998): Regulačné bariéry pre hospodársku súťaž v 
transformujúcich sa ekonomikách, ACE Phare štúdia, CPHR, Bratislava 
 
D. Zemanovičová (2000): Ekonomická transformácia v Slovenskej republike po 10 
rokoch, Finance a úvěr, č.10 
 
D. Zemanovičová a E. Sičáková (2001): Korupcia v SR ako celospoločenský problém 
(etický, morálny, ekonomický a politický), CPHR – Transparency International 
Slovensko, Bratislava 
 
D. Zemanovičová, E. Sičáková a P. Ondrejka (2001): Voľnosť v rozhodovaní ako 
zdroj korupcie, CPHR – Transparency International Slovensko, Bratislava 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  80 
 
